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Abstract 
A significant number of electronic control units (ECUs) are nowadays networked 
in automotive vehicles to help achieve advanced vehicle control and eliminate 
bulky electrical wiring. This, however, inevitably leads to increased complexity in 
vehicle fault diagnostics. Traditional off-board fault diagnostics and repair at 
service centres, by using only diagnostic trouble codes logged by conventional on- 
board diagnostics, can become unwieldy especially when dealing with intermittent 
faults in complex networked electronic systems. This can result in inaccurate and 
time consuming diagnostics due to lack of real-time fault information of the 
interaction among ECUs in the network-wide perspective. 
This thesis proposes a new framework for on-board knowledge-based 
diagnostics focusing on network level faults, and presents an implementation of a 
real-time in-vehicle network diagnostic system, using case-based reasoning. A 
newly developed fault detection technique and the results from several practical 
experiments with the diagnostic system using a network simulation tool, a 
hardware- in-the- loop simulator, a disturbance simulator, simulated ECUs and real 
ECUs networked on a test rig are also presented. The results show that the new 
vehicle diagnostics scheme, based on the proposed new framework, can provide 
more real-time network level diagnostic data, and more detailed and self- 
explanatory diagnostic outcomes. This new system can provide increased 
xvi 
diagnostic capability when compared with conventional diagnostic methods in 
terms of detecting message communication faults. In particular, the underlying 
incipient network problems that are ignored by the conventional on-board 
diagnostics are picked up for thorough fault diagnostics and prognostics which can 
be carried out by a whole-vehicle fault management system, contributing to the 
further development of intelligent and fault-tolerant vehicles. 
xvii 
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Terminology 
The following expressions describe terminology in fault detection and fault 
diagnosis. The expressions are the result of a coordinated action within the 
International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC) Technical Committee 
SAFEPROCESS, and German standards such as DIN and VDINDE Richtlinien 
[1,2]. 
Fault: Unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property of the 
system; 
Failure: Permanent interruption of a system's ability to perform a required 
function under specified operating conditions; 
Malfunction: Intermittent irregularity in fulfilment of a system desired function; 
Error: Deviation between a computed value (of an output variable) and the 
true, specified or theoretically correct value; 
Disturbance: An unknown (and uncontrolled) input acting on a system; 
Perturbation: An input acting on a system which results in a temporary departure 
from steady state; 
Residual: Fault indicator, based on deviations between measurements and 
model equation based calculations; 
Symptom: Change of an observable quantity from normal behaviour. 
Fault detection: Determination of faults present in a system and time of 
detection; 
Fault isolation: Determination of kind, location and time of detection of a 
fault by evaluating symptoms. Follows fault detection; 
Fault identification: Determination of the size and time-variant behaviour of a 
fault. Follows fault isolation; 
xx 
Fault diagnosis: Deten-nination of kind, size, location and time of detection of 
a fault by evaluating symptoms. Follows fault detection. 
Includes fault detection, isolation and identification; 
Monitoring: A continuous real-time task of determining the possible 
conditions of a physical system, recognising and indicating 
anomalies of the behaviour; 
Supervision: Monitoring a physical system and taking appropriate actions 
to maintain the operation in the case of faults; 
Protection: Means by which a potentially dangerous behaviour of the 
system is suppressed if possible, or means by which the 
consequences of a dangerous behaviour are avoided. 
Quantitative model: Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables 
and parameters in order to describe systems behaviour in 
quantitative mathematical terms; 
Qualitative model: Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables 
and parameters in order to describe system's behaviour in 
qualitative terms such as causalities or if-then rules; 
Diagnostic model: A set of static or dynamic relations which link specific input 
variables-the symptoms-to specific output variables-the 
faults; 
Analytical redundancy: Use of two,, but not necessarily identical ways to 
determine a quantity where one way uses a mathematical 
process model in analytical form. 
xxi 
Reliability: Ability of a system to perform a required function under 
stated conditions, within a given scope, during a given 
period of time. 
Safety: Ability of a system not to cause a danger for persons or 
equipment or environment; 
Availability: Probability that a system or equipment will operate 
satisfactorily and effectively at any point of time. 
The following general terms mostly used throughout the thesis are clarified as 
follows: 
Fault diagnostics: Procedures, means or actions of using fault diagnosis in 
finding problems or faults in a system; 
Message: A set of data represented in different bit patterns, and 
transmitted and received by ECUs through networks. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Automotive manufacturers continuously research and develop sophisticated 
products to meet customers' requirements, and more stringent legislation in terms 
of performance, safety, fuel consumption efficiency, environmental regulations and 
so forth. In parallel, rapid growth in performance and reliability of electronic 
embedded systems has occurred over the past two decades. Such performance and 
reliability enables manufacturers to implement complicated automotive control 
systems, which are difficult to achieve by the use of the traditional mechanical 
control. Electronic control systems used in automotive applications assist drivers to 
precisely control the vehicle through functions such as steering, traction, braking, 
stability, suspension, or engine control [3,4]. 
Most of the increased features are enabled through the use of distributed 
electronic systems integrated in the vehicle, including sensors, switches, actuators 
and ECUs. In today's premium automobiles, there can be fifty or more individual 
ECUs communicating over multiple multiplexed data networks such as Controller 
Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), FlexRay for X-by-wire 
applications etc. [5 - 9]. 
I 
However, as more and more features and ECUs are introduced, overall system 
complexity increases, in turn raising the likelihood for unpredicted or emergent 
behaviour that could not have been anticipated during ever shrinking system 
design, development, and validation and test cycles. These development cycles 
have reduced from 48 months in 1985 to 24 months in 2005, and are expected to be 
12 months in 2010 [10]. In addition, rising feature levels have resulted in the 
embedded software and electronic components becoming an increasing proportion 
of the total value of the vehicle. The average cost for in-vehicle electronic content 
increased from 2% of the total car price in 1974 to 23% in 2004, and is forecasted 
to reach 40% by 2010 [10]. Consequently, this becomes an increasing proportion of 
the overall warranty costs. In 2003, all vehicle manufacturers in the USA spent 
about 23 billion US dollars (approximately 1.9% of sales) on warranty costs [10]. 
Against this background, vehicle manufacturers are striving to reduce costs and 
to improve levels of customer satisfaction. Work to improve test and validation of 
large distributed electronic systems has been ongoing for years [I I- 14]. This has 
provided manufacturers with approaches to test and validation, with some degree of 
coverage. It is, however, still impossible to use an ideal test scheme that provides 
complete input test coverage to perform exhaustive testing and validation because 
of the large number of possible system states [151, possibly resulting in vehicles 
not working properly due to some design flaws and implementation errors. This is 
compounded by general wear out of mechanical, electrical and electronic 
components. 
To date, on-board diagnostic systems (OBD) have been integrated in ECUs to 
detect and diagnose vehicle faults such that diagnostic trouble codes (DTCs) 
relevant to the faults are set and logged in the ECUs' memory for later off-board, 
2 
return -to-dea I ersh ip -based fault analysis and rectification. Fig. 1-1 illustrates an 
off-board diagnostic tool being used to read logged DTCs in a vehicle for fault 
diagnostics. Despite the available OBD, diagnostic techniques have largely been 
focused on individual or defined areas of a vehicle e. g. engine management, brakes, 
steering, etc. In a vehicle where only a few ECUs and messages are deployed, 
traditional off-board diagnostics can be adequate. As system complexity continues 
to increase, off-board diagnostic approaches have become more costly and 
sometimes ineffective, resulting in high levels of "no-fault-found", incorrect 
component replacement and increased warranty costs. Most importantly, the 
consequences would discourage brand loyalty and bring a manufacturer into 
disrepute. 
If customer expectations and satisfaction for vehicle reliability are to be met, 
and warranty costs reduced despite the increasing complexity, a new approach to 
vehicle fault management is required. Failures will have to be managed in a way 
that does not require immediate retum-to-dealership repair actions, and enables the 
vehicle to remain in a safely drivable condition. This requires a paradigm shift from 
Fig. 1-1. Off-board vehicle diagnostics. 
3 
off-board deal e rship-based diagnostics and repair to on-board autonomous or 
remote ly-assisted diagnostics and in-vehicle repair [16]. To achieve this, an 
improved ability to diagnose in-vehicle failures that have impact all over the 
component, feature and network diagnostic levels becomes necessary [ 16,17]. 
The only way that will allow the failures to be analysed together on-board is to 
use the existing network as a link through which fault information from different 
diagnostic levels in ECUs can be transferred to the whole-vehicle fault 
management for analysis. However, the conventional vehicle diagnostics 
framework, particularly the network level, does not support this kind of mechanism 
since it was originally designed for off-board diagnostics based on the use of DTCs 
localised for individual ECUs. This thesis therefore addresses the limitation of the 
conventional diagnostics framework in terms of the ability to support fully on- 
board whole-vehicle diagnostics. 
This thesis proposes a new framework and methods for on-board diagnostics at 
the network level which is a key element for the realisation of fully on-board 
whole-vehicle diagnostic systems. The framework, which is designed to conform to 
the wel I-establ i shed fault detection and diagnosis scheme, will create an important 
link between the other two diagnostic levels-component and feature levels- 
among ECUs on the network. The impact of failures at all levels will be analysed 
together on-board. As a result, appropriate interventions can be taken in order to 
keep the vehicle in a safely driveable condition. 
The motivation for this work lies in enhancing vehicle diagnostics at the 
network level as an early response, in tenns of diagnostic capability, to the 
exponential growth in the electronic and software content 
in vehicles. At the 
network level, not all network problems or error conditions occur persistently; 
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rather, some faults slowly or intermittently develop such as communication errors 
due to loose physical connectors. It is therefore possible that the underlying 
network problems or error conditions can go un-diagnosed and later cause 
disruption on the whole network. This is because the incipient failures are mostly 
ignored by the conventional network level diagnostic applications. 
The new network level diagnostic framework proposed in this thesis is intended 
to be a key element that greatly contributes to a realisation of the paradigm shift 
from off-board to fully on-board vehicle diagnostics. The underlying network 
problems will be monitored and analysed. The framework suggests a means of all 
local diagnostic information at all diagnostic levels being gathered and analysed by 
an on-board whole-vehicle fault management system. This will also enhance 
vehicle fault tolerance and reliability. Unnecessary costs spent for incorrect 
component replacement due to "no-fault-found" and "mis-diagnosed" would be 
dramatically reduced, thereby reducing maintenance and warranty costs. 
An implementation of a real-time in-vehicle network diagnostic system 
(RINDS)-a central diagnostic system that monitors and diagnoses network level 
faults in real-time by using case-based reasoning-is demonstrated through 
experiments. This diagnostic system based on the proposed framework is 
developed to demonstrate that the system can provide improved diagnostic ability 
at the network level such that increased whole-vehicle diagnostic capability, when 
compared with conventional diagnostic methods, can be achieved. 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides background literature on the general fault detection, isolation 
and diagnosis scheme with its applications, in-vehicle electronics and 
networks, an existing network management standard, and fault 
5 
diagnostics of in-vehicle electronic systems. Current and foreseeable 
problems that need to be addressed are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses system requirements and presents the new framework and 
methods for on-board network level diagnostics proposed in this thesis. 
The concept and the structure of the framework are described in detail. 
Chapter 4 discusses how an on-board network level diagnostic system based on 
the proposed framework can be realised. Enhanced techniques newly 
developed in this thesis, and existing technologies and methodologies 
that can potentially be deployed in developing the diagnostic system 
are discussed. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates an implementation of an on-board network level 
diagnostic system based on the framework through experiments 
sequentially conducted in three steps: 
9 Preliminary software-based simulation for proof of concept by 
using a CAN bus simulation tool; 
9 Partial system experiment in which the simulated system is 
implemented to function with actual hardware by using the 
CAN bus simulation tool and a hardware- 1 n-the-loop (HIL) 
simulation facility; 
* Full system experiment where the implemented network level 
diagnostic system is connected to an actual in-vehicle network 
on an industrial in-vehicle electrical and electronic test rig-a 
Lab-Car. 
Chapter 6 discusses exPerimental results, various issues arising from the 
experiments demonstrated in Chapter 5, and how the proposed 
6 
framework can further contribute to other automotive manufacturing 
processes and the development of intelligent vehicles. 
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion of the thesis and discusses future work. 
7 
Chapter 2 
Literature review 
In this chapter, background literature and related work on the general fault 
detection, isolation and diagnosis scheme with its applications is reviewed. in- 
vehicle electronics and networks, an existing network management standard, and 
fault diagnostics of in-vehicle electronic systems are discussed. Current and 
foreseeable problems as a result of rapid growth in electronic and software contents 
in automobiles are discussed. 
2.1 General fault detection, isolation and diagnosis 
This section provides a literature review on the general scheme for fault detection 
and diagnosis. The scheme has been widely discussed and implemented in various 
engineering applications such as aerospace, telecommunications, automotive 
industry etc. 
Fault detection and isolation (FDI), and fault diagnosis (FD) have become of 
importance in modem process automation and control as they provide the pre- 
requisites for fault tolerance, reliability or security, which constitute fundamental 
design features in complex engineering systems. A variety of FDI-FD approaches 
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have been developed over the last two decades [18]. The early detection of faults 
can prevent a system from malfunction, shutdown, damage and loss involving the 
equipment and human lives. Fig. 2-1 (from [2]) illustrates the general scheme for 
FDl-FD based on measured variables from sensors, and observed variables and 
states by human operators e. g. colour observations. Features are extracted from the 
measured or observed variables, and are used by the change detection to generate 
symptoms. The symptoms, which are unusual changes for the features, are taken as 
inputs of the unified symptom representation in order to perform the diagnosis [2]. 
The processing and evaluation of the measured and the observed variables in 
the general FDI-FD scheme are knowledge- intensive, and can be considered within 
a knowledge-based FDI-FD scheme as described in [2,19], and shown in Fig. 2-2. 
The scheme is divided into two main tasks: an FDI task and an FD task. The FDI 
task generates analytical and heuristic symptoms. The analytical symptoms are 
generated by a comparison between extracted features and normal features of the 
non-faulty process. The heuristic symptoms are produced by using available 
qualitative information from human observation and inspection. The FD task is 
responsible for determining the type, size and time of detection of faults, based on 
the generated symptoms [ 19]. 
.4 -Fault detection 01.4 -Fault diagnosis ON. 
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V generation detection 
Process 
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representation 
Faults 
Feature Change 
selection detection ------ 
Observed Observed Heuristic 
variables features symptoms 
Fig. 2-1. General scheme for fault detection and diagnosis with analytical and 
heuristic knowledge (from [2]). 
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Fig. 2-2. Overall scheme of knowledge-based FDI-FD (from [2]). 
2.1.1 Fault Detection and Isolation task 
The enabling technologies for the FDI task can be generally divided into two main 
categories: model-based approaches and data-driven approaches. A model-based 
approach is defined in [20] as the determination of faults of a system from the 
comparison of available system measurements with a priori information 
represented by the system's mathematical model, through generation of residual 
quantities and their analysis. A scheme for model-based fault detection, adapted 
from [21], is illustrated in Fig. 2-3 where U, N, Y and s are the sets of inputs, 
noises, outputs and symptoms of the system respectively. 
A residual is one of the 
features generated from the comparison of the measured with mathematically 
calculated variables. The generated 
"residual" (or "innovation") is used to indicate 
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fault conditions of the monitored system [20]. The main advantage is that 
unanticipated faults can be detected since they are analysed from the mathematical 
model of the systems. Despite this, the major drawback is that a precise 
mathematical model of the plant is required and the performance is dependent on 
the accuracy of the model. To overcome this, a number of algorithms and 
approaches to robust residual generation with respect to disturbances or modelling 
errors and uncertainty have been developed, which were discussed and reviewed in 
[18,20,22 - 25]. 
However,, different approaches are required when dealing with uncertain 
systems where system models cannot be well defined [26]. In contrast, data-driven 
approaches, which are trained off-line with known fault patterns or collected data, 
can detect anticipated faults without requiring an accurate model [27]. This 
approach deploys artificial intelligent techniques such as neural networks (NNs) or 
Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) for training diagnostic systems. 
Faults /Faults / Faults N 
Actuators Proce Sensors 
- ---------- 
Process 
model 
Model-based 
7 fault detection 
Feature 
generation 
r, 0, x features 
Normal Change 
behaviour detection 
s analytical symptoms 
Fig. 2-3. Model-based fault detection scheme (adapted from [21]). 
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FIS has been playing an important role in data-driven fault diagnostics. By 
using membership functions (MFs), exact numerical values are mapped into 
linguistic expressions such as "good", "fair", "poor" such that they are easily 
understood by humans. FIS can model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge 
and reasoning process without the need of employing precise quantitative analyses. 
This allows FIS to efficiently deal with system uncertainty. 
However, there was no standard method for transforming human knowledge 
into a rule base or database of an FIS, and no effective method for tuning MFs to 
minimise output errors or maximise a performance index. An Adaptive -network- 
based Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS), proposed in [28], is a novel architecture 
for constructing a set of fuzzy if-then rules with appropriate MFs. ANFIS 
maximises system performance by using an input/output data set to train an FIS, by 
which its MI's are refined. In addition, the coactive adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference 
system (CANFIS) proposed in [29] is capable of dealing with systems where 
multiple outputs are required. 
Fig. 2-4 shows an ANFIS equivalent to a Takagi-Sugeno FIS which contains 
two fuzzy if-then rules [28,30]. The inputs x, y are converted into a fuzzy set by 
means of various fonns of membership functions on linguistic labels Ai and Bi. The 
output signals from this layer are multiplied in the multiplication layer where each 
node output represents the firing strength of a fuzzy rule. In the layer 3, the firing 
strength is normalised by the summation of all firing strengths, and output 
parameters called normalized firing strengths are created. Defuzzification is 
performed in the layer 4 by using fuzzy if-then rules (or non-fuzzy rules for 
Takagi-Sugeno types). The last layer calculates the overall output as the summation 
of all incoming signals. 
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Fig. 2-4. ANFIS equivalent to a Takagi-Sugeno FIS (from [28]). 
Applications of data-driven approach to FDI were presented and discussed in 
[31 - 34]. Approaches to FDI for dynamic systems by integrating both quantitative 
and qualitative model information, based on soft computing (SC) methods were 
surveyed in [25]. It was emphasised that by combining together a fuzzy rule-based 
strategy with a neural network powerful diagnostic results can be obtained. This is 
because the advantages of both methods are utilised when using the combined NNs 
and FIS method, so-called fuzzy neural networks (FNNs). 
2.1.2 Fault Diagnosis task 
The FD task in the knowledge-based FDI-FD scheme is responsible for 
determination of kind,, size and time of detection of a fault by evaluating the 
analytic and heuristic symptoms. A unified symptom representation is used to 
represent the different symptom types in a unified way. For instance, the symptoms 
can be represented as fuzzy membership functions. The unified symptoms are then 
fed into a diagnosis process. 
Two major groups of methods for FD that have been reported over a decade are 
data classification or pattern-based methods, and inference or reasoning methods, 
surnmarised in the survey in Fig. 2-5. 
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Fig. 2-5. Survey on fault diagnosis (taken from [2]). 
A classification method classifies input data (symptoms) by matching with the 
known data pattern such that the symptoms are mapped to the relevant faults. The 
commonly used classification methods have been statistical, approximation, 
density-based and artificial intelligence methods where different approaches to 
symptom classification are used [2]. For instance, Bayes classification determines 
classes of symptoms by using statistical distribution of the symptoms. Geometric 
classification,, one of the density-based methods, classifies symptoms by their 
geometric distances from a reference point. A neural network or fuzzy classifier is 
used to cope with the nonlinear behaviour of data. A scheme for fault diagnosis 
using neural NNs is shown in Fig. 2-6 where NNs are deployed for both residual 
generation and classification. A neural network is a processing system in which 
units called neurons are interconnected by weighted links. The major advantages of 
NNs are the learning ability and the fact that the mathematical model of the system 
is not required. NNs can be trained to represent relationships between the value of 
the data and the known faults [25]. 
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Fig. 2-6 Neural Networks scheme for fault diagnosis (taken from [25]). 
For inference methods, if some relationships between faults and features, which 
represent symptoms, are known, they can be recorded as inference IF-THEN rules 
in a fault-pattern library. The inference methods range from simple rule-based 
binary reasoning by using fault trees, case-based reasoning (CBR), to the more 
complex hybrid FNNs. Fault trees are constructed to represent known binary 
relationships between faults, symptoms and immediate events. Qualitative 
knowledge used in a diagnosis process using fault trees can be represented in a 
form of rules such as: 
IF(feature I is 0) THEN Fl 
IF(feature I is 0) AND (feature 2 is 1) THEN F2 
where Fn is a fault mode. 
The simple binary relationship is, however, not suited for diagnosing symptoms 
which mostly do not have Boolean values. In this case, the knowledge can be 
represented by using fuzzy linguistic meaning such as: 
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IF(feature I is low) THEN F1 
IF(feature I is low) AND (feature 2 is medium) THEN F2 
where Fn is a fault mode. 
Performing diagnosis for these symptoms is normally based on fuzzy logic 
systems. However, the difficulty is how to choose appropriate membership 
functions. Hybrid FNNs make use of the learning ability of NNs to optimise the 
parameters of the fuzzy system. In a situation where heuristic knowledge from 
experts and experimental data are available, FNNs are implemented for fault 
diagnosis since fuzzy rules can be generated from the available knowledge and 
data. 
2.2 Applications of FDI-FD 
The FDI-FD scheme has been applied to fault detection and diagnosis in various 
applications. These include medical diagnosis, customer service helpdesks, 
industrial processes and machines, transport, computer networks, etc. This section 
is intended to review literature on some particular aforementioned applications that 
are most relevant to the thesis: industrial processes and machines, transport and 
computer networks. Applications of FDl-FD to in-vehicle electronics and networks 
are separately reviewed in Section 2.5. 
2.2.1 Industrial processes and machines 
Applications of the FDI-FD in industrial processes and machines have been 
ongoing for more than two decades [35 - 38]. In the late 1980's, the IFAC 
SAFEPROCESS technical committee was set up in response to a rising need for a 
forum on issues of performance, reliability and safety in process control systems 
[39]. This subsection briefly reviews a number of FDI-FD applications involving 
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machine condition (health) monitoring, fault detection and diagnosis in technical 
processes. 
The use of process models and robust observer-based methods enables early 
fault detection in the process or the machines involved, thus resulting in efficiency 
and safety [40]. A model-based approach exploiting analytical redundancy for FDI 
in an industrial gas turbine prototype was presented in [41 ]. The paper suggests that 
identified linear models should be exploited in a nonlinear system in order to 
simplify the computing algorithm. The results show that this approach provides 
robust solutions for minimising effects of modelling errors and noise while 
maximising fault sensitivity. Analytical fault detection applied to a real-time fault 
diagnostic system of a heat exchanger was presented in [42]. The system deploys 
velocity-based linearisation to decompose a nonlinear system into a number of 
linear tasks, parity relations and an observer. The FD task is achieved by using a 
transferable belief model (TMB) which is suited for reasoning inconsistent data. 
An approach to FDI of faulty operation of the analysers in an ethylene cracking 
furnace was presented in [43]. The approach uses a combination of principle 
component analysis (PCA) and two NNs, a radial basis function network (RBFN), 
and self-organisation map (SOM) to detect and isolate faults from process data 
without long delays. Improved diagnosis performance can be achieved by the 
combined approach. 
2.2.2 Transport 
The FDI-FD scheme has been playing an important role in improving safety and 
impact to the environment of vehicles including aircraft, trains, automobiles etc. 
Despite the same goal, the constraints and requirements in each case are different. 
For instance, aerospace systems are most safety-critical and require strictly regular 
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maintenance, whereas FDI-FD approaches for ground vehicles are sometimes 
compromised by concern of the end-product cost. 
A ircraft 
Safety-critical computer and electronic systems such as those in aerospace 
applications require the reliability and fault tolerance of different control devices 
and sensors. The common approach to fault tolerance in aerospace systems is 
hardware redundancy which involves three basic forms: static, dynamic and hybrid 
redundancy [44]. A combination of different approaches can enhance the FDI-FD 
applied to aircraft condition monitoring [45]. 
For FDI, analytical (or functional) redundancy has been proposed to be an 
alternative to the sole use of redundant hardware, which can reduce overall weight 
and cost. All sensors on an aircraft are related by the flight mechanics equations, 
which can be used in fault detection procedures [46]. Some studies of analytical 
methods of FDI-FD for aircraft sensor systems are outlined and described in [46], 
including sensor redundancy, fault detection techniques using filters provided by 
observation and estimation theories,, model-based, rule-based and expert systems. 
An approach to aircraft sensor/actuator fault diagnosis based on statistical analysis 
of sequences of residuals and a Robust Kalman Filter was proposed in [47]. 
Although this approach requires particular statistics, from the simulation results, it 
is able to isolate sensor and actuator faults more easily. A novel nonlinear observer 
based approach proposed in [48] was developed to detect and isolate sensor faults 
in a small commercial aircraft. The approach exploiting an unknown input observer 
scheme was integrated into a duplex hardware architecture. The simulation and test 
results show improved perfon-nance of the classical duplex hardware system. An 
application of model-based FDI to a brushless DC motor used to drive outflow 
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valves in an aircraft was discussed in [21,49,50]. In this application, FDI using a 
combination of parameter estimation and parity equations was implemented. The 
results show that simulated faults can be detected and isolated by monitoring the 
changes of the residual of four concerned variables. By measuring the four 
variables online, implementation as a smart actuator is possible. Multiple nonlinear 
models with a supervisory scheme in [5 1] were implemented for fault diagnosis of 
a turbine engine which has different effects and parameters due to manufacturing 
tolerances. In addition to model-based approaches, a fault diagnosis system for 
airplane engines using Bayesian Network (BN) and distributed particle swarm 
optimisation (PSO) was presented in [52]. The results show that without expert 
knowledge the PSO-based BN is able to determine whether input data is from a 
faulty engine, and could be used in any online or offline decision support system. 
Automobiles 
The major application of fault diagnosis in automobiles was originally for 
emission control required by more stringent legislation. An engine sensor fault may 
lead to not only engine breakdown, but also more toxic emission from the car. 
Recently, applications of FDl-FD have been extended to cover various areas such 
as safety and ride quality. 
Simple and practical methodologies for engine misfire detection were discussed 
in [53] where a nonlinear extension to diagnostic models is proposed. The results 
show that the model extension provides a more compact and simple model 
structure with better capabilities to handle nonlinearities. A model-based approach 
to FDI-FD on modern diesel engines was developed in [54]. The work 
demonstrated improved fault coverage in the engine subsystems by using various 
types of residual generators. Recent work in [55] presented more complex FDl-FD 
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for internal combustion engines using an adaptive order tracking technique and 
artificial NNs. These proposed methods were used to improve network training 
time and averaged recognition rate. The work in [56,57] presented experimental 
results of model-based FDI-FD of an electromechanical throttle actuator, a 
suspension system and the lateral behaviour of a passenger car, and discussed 
methods for fault-tolerant sensors and actuators required for drive-by-wire systems. 
An integration of model- and knowledge-based non-real-time diagnostic methods 
in one diagnostic scheme was demonstrated in [58] where the objective was to 
enhance the performance of diagnostic tools in complex nonlinear systems. 
Principles of evaluating model-based diagnostic systems were discussed in [59] 
where a systematic and automatic design procedure is proposed for minimizing 
time-consuming work in designing diagnostic systems. For work on chassis and 
vehicle dynamics, model-based FDI-FD approaches to chassis monitoring, lateral 
and vertical dynamics, and sensor faults were considered in [60 - 62] respectively. 
In [60], hierarchical diagnostic systems with a supervisor were developed to detect 
faults in a brake-by-wire system. Improved robust FDI-FD can be achieved in [61] 
by the use of a combined parameter estimation, parity equation and fuzzy logic. In 
[62], redundant sub-models were used to construct analytical redundancy, and 
residual generation and evaluation. Adaptive thresholds and longer residual 
evaluation time were implemented to avoid false alarm during unstable driving 
situations (experimented by a slalom manoeuvre). 
Other relevant applications 
Condition monitoring of railway tracks using neuro-fuzzy systems was 
developed in [32]. According to the simulation results, this combined quantitative 
and qualitative approach is able to classify the healthiness of the track circuit with 
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satisfactory performance. A model-based approach presented in [63] 
accommodates valve faults on a reusable rocket engine. The simulated valve faults 
can be identified and the valve's position can be estimated. An observer-based FD 
scheme for unmanned under water vehicles was presented in [64] where a bank of 
extended Kalman filters and residual evaluators are deployed to deal with noise and 
model uncertainty. A CBR system to support conflict resolution task for air traffic 
control was developed in [65]. The system can provide air traffic controllers with 
assistance to solve conflict between sets of aircraft. Olsson et al. proposed a new 
method for fault diagnosis by means of CBR and signal processing which was 
applied to diagnose faults in industrial robots [66]. A case-functional-based 
diagnostic system (CFDS), an integration of CBR and a functional -based reasoning 
approach, was proposed by Mohamed et al. to reduce analysis processes by getting 
the strength of each approach, and compensating weakness of each other [67]. The 
system was applied to fault diagnosis of an uninterrupted power supply (UPS). 
2.2.3 Computer networks 
Computer networks are of utmost importance in the globalisation era. Increasing 
demands for transferring large amounts of information through networks imply 
network availability and reliability. Network faults can cause further disruption in 
other networks that are connected or interacting with the faulty network. In general, 
these faults and network disruption are accommodated by network management 
systems which have been developed in parallel for more than two decades [68]. 
Different sophisticated modem networks require different diagnostic methods and 
techniques. Fault diagnostic techniques and schemes, fault management 
frameworks, and well-known commercial products have been proposed and are 
available in the market [69 - 73]. 
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Katzela and Schwartz presented schemes for fault identification in 
communication networks [69]. The schemes include network system modelling 
that takes into account dependencies among different objects in the 
telecommunication environment, an approach to find a near-optimum explanation 
of received alarms and a diagnosis algorithm for systems where an independent 
failure assumption is valid. The results show that despite higher computational 
complexity, increased diagnostic accuracy can be obtained by involving 
dependencies among objects in the network. A fault diagnosis system for Local 
Area Networks (LAN) was discussed in [73] where fault propagation behaviour 
was concerned. The behaviour was modelled by using a finite state machine 
technique while an automated fault diagnosis system was based on a fault 
propagation duration concept. Severity of detected faults was also estimated in 
order for timely actions to be taken. Ssu et al. proposed an alternative approach to 
detection and diagnosis of data inconsistency in wireless sensor networks [74]. 
Fault detection was performed at a receiving node by checking consistency of 
multiple duplicated data packages transmitted from a transmitter via different 
paths. A fault diagnosis task was conducted by the use of a diagnostic SET/CLEAR 
message to isolate and remove the faulty node(s) from the network. The simulation 
results show that the system performance achieved 96% with acceptable additional 
overheads and power consumption. A study on a potential implementation of CBR 
for automated testing of complex telecommunication systems was discussed in 
[75]. CBR can be used to automatically generate a brief summary of faults in 
networks from the large amount of collected test data, thus easing the data analysis 
process. Artificial intelligence and inference systems have also been employed for 
not only network diagnosis but also ensuring network security [76 - 77]. 
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2.3 In-vehicle electronics and networks 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, over the past two decades, the rapid 
growth in performance and reliability of electronic embedded systems has enabled 
vehicle manufacturers to implement complicated automotive control systems 
through the use of sophisticated electronic devices. Different electronic devices 
performing different functions are integrated in a vehicle, mostly transferring 
signals via electrical wiring. 
State-of-the-art control algorithms and rapidly-improved semiconductor 
technology make it possible for modem vehicles to meet the demands for driver- 
assisted functions, safety, comfort and environment protection. A number of 
sensors are used to measure controlled variables as input signals for ECUs e. g. 
engine speed. The input signals can be analogue e. g. voltage signals from 
temperature sensors, digital such as switch positions, or modulated e. g. Pulse 
Width Modulation (PWM) signals. With these input signals, ECUs calculate 
required controlling signals to adjust controlling devices e. g. actuators. Improved 
performance and additional functions are obtained by synchronising processes 
controlled by individual control units and by adapting their respective parameters 
to each other in real-time. An example of this type of function is a traction control 
system (TCS) which reduces the driving torque when the drive wheels spin [78]. 
2.3.1 In-vehicle electronics 
In 1902, a magneto-ignition system, the first on-board electrical system was 
installed in a vehicle. It consisted of the magneto itself, an ignition distributor, 
ignition coils, spark plugs and cables. More than a decade later, Bosch had the first 
complete automotive electrical system ready for installation. 
The system comprised 
the magneto-ignition system with spark plugs, a starter, a generator, headlamps, a 
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battery, and a regulator switch. This was the starting point of a progress towards a 
genuine on-board electrical and electronics system [78]. Today's in-vehicle 
electronic systems have become extensive and much more complicated. A large 
number of electronic devices including sensors, switches, actuators, ECUs, and 
software contents are integrated in a modern vehicle. Applications range from 
simple door or window control to remotely wireless data transfer between a vehicle 
to another vehicle or the infrastructure. Fig. 2-7, adapted from [79], illustrates the 
exponentially soaring complexity of today's in-vehicle electronics. 
In-vehicle electronics can be broadly classified into four main categories 
corresponding to different functionalities, constraints and models [80]: "Powertrain", 
"'Chassis", "Body", and "Infotainment" including telematics, multimedia, various 
types of information and entertainment. 
"'Powertrain" refers to components that generate power and deliver it to the road 
surface. This includes the engine, transmission, clutches, driveshaft etc. "Powertrain" 
sometimes simply refers to the engine and transmission, and the other components in 
the transmission. "Chassis" involves the systems that control the interaction of the 
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Fig. 2-7. Rapid increase in in-vehicle electronic systems (adapted from [791). 
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vehicle with the road and the chassis. It is related to steering, braking and ride 
quality. This category includes systems such as ABS (Anti-lock Braking System), 
ESP (Electronic Stability Program) and the new forthcoming technology so-called X- 
by-Wire. "Body" refers to the electronic systems not directly involved in the 
movement of the vehicle. These are, for instance, the systems that control doors, 
windows, seats, boots, etc. [3,5,80]. "Infotainment" provides drivers with 
information and entertainment through HMI (Human Machine Interface). This 
enables drivers to see or exchange not only in-vehicle information and entertainment 
such as vehicle conditions and movies from an in-car video player, but also 
information from remote sources via telematics [80]. 
2.3.2 In-vehicle networks 
Historically, the communication between simple electronic devices was mostly 
achieved by using point-to-point links, as shown in Fig. 2-8 a). Signals in the 
vehicle were transmitted and received among ECUs by the use of non-multiplexed 
and hard-wired cables. However, this resulted in bulky, expensive and complicated 
wiring when dealing with the increasing use of ECUs, because the number of 
required communication channels grows exponentially with the number of ECUs 
[3]. The attempt to eliminate wiring difficulties and to improve automotive 
distributed control systems became an interesting issue for automotive 
manufacturers. A wiring harness of a middle-class vehicle was roughly I mile long 
and included approximately 300 connectors with 2,000 pins [78,81]. The early 
1980s saw the emerging solutions for vehicle networking, many of which were 
based on simple data transfer e. g. point-to-point or master-slave UART (Universal 
Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter) [4]. 
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As requirements in vehicle control grew quickly, and were mostly based on 
real-time control strategies, such simple network configurations and protocols 
became unwieldy. In the mid 1980s, Robert Bosch GmbH invented a robust 
automotive control network known as CAN. CAN is based on a bus configuration, 
as shown in Fig. 2-8 b), which allows ECUs connected on the bus to receive in- 
vehicle signals digitally encoded in CAN messages at almost the same time. This 
significantly enhances real-time applications in the vehicle. 
More recently, there have also been several other communication protocols and 
network topologies that have been used in different categories, depending on the 
requirements of the applications such as Local Interconnect Network (LIN) for 
"Body", Time-Triggered CAN (TTCAN) for "Powertrain", FlexRay for X-by-wire 
applications, MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) for infotainment, and the 
short-range wireless communication Bluetooth [5]. This section only summarises 
the well-known networks which have been in wide spread use. Fig. 2-9, adapted 
from [82], shows a cost and speed comparison of different networks. 
ECU ECU ECU ECU 
In-vehicle network 
ECU 174 ECU II ECU II ECU 
a) b) 
Fig. 2-8. Evolution of in-vehicle networks. 
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Controller Area Network (CAN) 
CAN is one of the advanced serial communication protocols widely used in 
automotive and industrial automation applications. Fig. 2-10 illustrates a CAN bus 
topology in a typical automotive application where a number of ECUs can be 
connected on a high-speed CAN (CAN-HS) and a low-speed CAN (CAN-LS) 
buses which are connected via a gateway. 
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Fig. 2-10. CAN in automotive application. 
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As a communication protocol, CAN complies with the two bottom layers of the 
Open Systems interconnection model (OSI) standardized by the International 
Organisation of Standardisation (ISO). The OSI layer I and layer 2 are described in 
the ISO 11519-2 standard for low speed applications (125 kbps. ) and ISO 11898 
standard for high speed applications (up to IMbps. ) [83]. ISO 11898 includes 
specifications of the electrical characteristics, a bus cable comprising two signal 
wires namely CAN High (CAN_H) and CAN Low (CAN_L) with a nominal line 
impedance of 120 ohms. As illustrated in Fig. 2-11, if the voltage of CAN_H is not 
greater than the voltage of CANJ plus 0.5 V, this condition is called a recessive 
bit (Boolean 1). If the voltage of CAN_H is at least 0.9 V greater than CAN_L, it is 
defined as a dominant bit (Boolean 0). 
V 
+1 
vi 
CAN_H 
CANJ 
Recessive Dominant 
Fig. 2-11. ISO 11898 physical layer. 
t 
It is recommended that two termination 120-ohm resistors (RT) be connected at 
both ends of a CAN bus, as illustrated in Fig. 2-12. These resistors help maintain 
correct DC voltage levels and prevent signal reflection at the end of the bus. 
CAN_H 
- ---------------- 
RT 
CAN-L 
. ................ 
RT 
Fig. 2-12. CAN bus with termination resistors and connected nodes. 
0.9 V. 
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When a node, e. g. an ECU, is connected to the bus, it means that the differential 
input resistance of the node (Rdiff) is connected in parallel to the bus resistance. 
Therefore, the total differential bus resistance (Rdff(,,,, j)) without the wire resistance 
can be calculated as follows: 
RT 
x 
Rdiff 
Rdiff 
(total) -2n RT 
+ 
Rdiff 
2n 
where RTis bus termination resistance and n is the number of nodes on the bus. 
A CAN communication controller is used in each ECU to control message 
transmission between ECUs connected on the same bus. CAN uses an arbitration 
feature,, illustrated in Fig. 2-13, to control bus access in order to avoid transmission 
collision which causes communication errors. Higher priority messages which are 
normally assigned lower message identifications (IDs) have higher priorities to 
access the bus. For instance,, in Fig. 2-13, node B loses the arbitration to node A 
because the third bit of node B (recessive) is replaced by the third bit of node A 
(dominant). 
If errors occur during communication, an error management feature in the 
communication controller detects, handles and confines such errors. An error frame 
is transmitted to notify ECUs that errors have been detected so that the ECUs 
ignore the message recently present on the bus. The errors involve Bit Error, Bit 
Stuffing Error, CRC Error, Form Error and Acknowledgement Error. Effect of the 
errors is also limited by CAN controllers to prevent communication failure. Further 
details on CAN can be found in [83]. 
29 
II 
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CAN_H FL 
Node BI JO-1 
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CAN Bus level 
FL 
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Node B loses the arbitration 
Fig. 2-13. CAN arbitration. 
In case of communication loss, network-re levant DTCs are set and logged in 
the ECUs that expect the lost messages. In addition to basic CAN, research on 
reliability improvement of CAN for use in X-by-wire applications has been 
ongoing for more than 15 years, such as time-triggered CAN and time-triggered 
protocol (TTP) [6 - 9]. 
Applications of CAN embrace not only vehicle control but also diagnostic 
services. Despite the common diagnosis standards such as ISO 9141 K-line, ISO 
14230 KWP2000 (Keyword Protocol 2000), ISO 15765 etc., the trend of diagnostic 
services is towards diagnostics over CAN such as the standard defined in ISO 
14229. 
Local Interconnect Network (LIN) 
LIN is a low cost serial communication system based on the common Universal 
Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter data format, a single -master/mu Itip le - slave 
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. qtnrt 
concept, a single-wire 12V bus, and a clock synchronization for nodes without 
stabilised time base. The bus access of LIN is controlled by a master node so that 
no arbitration or collision management in slave nodes is required, thus providing a 
guarantee of the worst-case latency time for signal transmission. A master node can 
handle up to 15 slave nodes, and is also connected to another bus e. g. CAN as a 
gateway to relay data between different buses. 
LIN provides a low-bandwidth (up to 20 Kbps. ) and cost-effective solution for 
the communication between sensors and actuators, as previously illustrated in Fig. 
2-9. Typical applications are communications among smart electronic devices such 
as doors, seats, lighting, rain sensor, electric windows or mirrors. The commonly 
used analogue coding of signals for serial communications is replaced by digital 
signals, leading to an optimized wiring harness [82]. 
Time- Triggered Protocol (TTPIC) 
The Time-Triggered Protocol (TTP) is a real-time communication protocol for 
the interconnection of electronic modules of distributed fault-tolerant real-time 
systems. TTP/C was developed at the Technical University of Vienna (TU Wien) 
and originally intended to meet the requirements of SAE class C automotive 
applications. The current protocol specification is targeted at distributed real-time 
systems with strong requirements for safety and availability in automotive and 
aerospace electronics as well as industrial control [84,85]. TTP/C is based on the 
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme. Nodes can access the bus and 
send a data frame at a specified time slot. A bus guardian (13G) is used to protect 
the communication from babbling-idiot nodes e. g. nodes that send messages 
untimely. Due to its fault-tolerant characteristic and high data rate 
(up to 25 Mbps 
in synchronous mode), TTP/C can be used in X-by-Wire applications. 
31 
FlexRay 
FlexRay is one of the latest in-vehicle network protocols developed by the 
FlexRay Consortium comprising seven core partners (www. flexray. com). FlexRay 
is a combination of a static time-triggered FlexRay protocol and a dynamic event- 
triggered Byteflight protocol developed by another consortium (www. byteflight. com). 
The recent FlexRay specification has been released, which serves as a 
communication infrastructure for real-time and high integrity vehicle control 
applications e. g. X-by-Wire. The protocol provides scalability and flexible network 
topologies within a single framework. The topology can be configured as linear 
passive bus structures, passive stars or active stars. A communication cycle consists 
of a series of a static window (time-triggered) and a dynamic window (event- 
triggered). In the static window, the communication is periodic and based on 
TDMA. A node transmits a frame with a frame ID when the current slot ID 
matches the ID of the pending frame. The node may occupy up to 16 slots within a 
cycle and may transmit up to 16 frames within one cycle. In the dynamic window, 
Flexible TDMA (FTDMA) is used, where the window is divided into a number of 
mini-slots. After possessing a particular number of mini-slots, a node transmits a 
frame inside the given mini-slots. Similar to TTP/C, a bus guardian is used to avoid 
babbling idiot failures. A transmitting node requests permission from its own bus 
guardian that it is ready to transmit a frame to the bus. The bus guardian allows the 
transmission period which corresponds to the system specification. With the 
deterministic and fault-tolerant mechanism, FlexRay is intended to be the de facto 
standard in the automotive industry for high integrity applications. FlexRay 
development tools and controller chips such as network design and simulation tools, 
and bus drivers are currently available from some of the consortium members. 
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Media Oriented System Transport (MOST) 
MOST is a synchronous network developed in 1998 by the MOST consortium 
which comprises vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers 
(www. mostnet. de). According to the consortium, MOST is the de factor standard 
for in-vehicle multimedia and infotainment networking. MOST supports a data 
transfer rate of 24.8 Mb/s, which allows transferring high-speed data stream of 
audio, video or information and services for drivers e. g. navigation systems. The 
physical layer is optical fibres which provide higher noise immunity. The MOST 
specification defines control channels and data channels. A timing master device 
supplies the clock with a synchronous and continuous data signal as a base signal. 
Other devices synchronise their operation to this base signal. Within the 
synchronous base signal, multiple streaming data channels and a control channel 
are transported. The control channel sets up what streaming data channels the 
sender and receiver use. Once the connection is established,, streaming data can 
flow continuously. Addressing or processing of packet label information is not 
required. The data channel bandwidth is always available and reserved for the 
dedicated stream, resulting in no interruptions, collisions, or slow-downs in the 
transport of the data stream [86]. 
In summary, there are a number of different network protocols and 
configurations used in the vehicle, depending on the applications and cost 
constrains. Low-cost LIN networks are suited for controlling simple, non-real-time 
and non-safety-critical devices such as door, seat or window control. CAN 
networks are mostly deployed for transmission of messages that are used in more 
real-time control applications e. g. engine control. MOST provides very 
high bit 
rate through fibre optics, which makes transferring a 
large amount of infotainment 
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data possible. The world's first production vehicle equipped with FlexRay was the 
2007 BMW X5. It features a combination of active roll stabilisation and electronic 
damping control technologies, so-called AdaptiveDrive. This new feature benefits 
from the FlexRay system where the transceiver chipset is the TJA 1080 supplied by 
NXP Semiconductors [87]. It is also anticipated that, in the foreseeable future, 
FlexRay will be deployed more widely in other X-by-Wire applications such as 
those in the 2009 BMW X6 [88]. 
2.4 Existing network management standard 
It is well understood that generally automotive manufacturers do not develop ECUs 
themselves; rather they mostly outsource this task to different suppliers to develop 
ECUs in accordance with the manufacturers' specifications and existing standards. 
ECUs from different suppliers are then integrated and networked into vehicles by 
the manufacturers. One such well-known standard related to in-vehicle networks is 
OSEK Network Management (OSEK NM) which is discussed in this section. 
Due to the increasing number of ECUs deployed in vehicles, the Open Systems 
and the Corresponding Interfaces for Automotive Electronics (OSEKNDX) 
working group has defined a standard for communication of ECUs in automotive 
application, called Network Management or NM, illustrated in Fig. 2-14 [89]. NM 
resides in the environment where an Operating System (OS) controls system 
interactions among different software layers. NM consists of algorithms defined by 
OSEK and protocol specific algorithms. NM can communicate with the application 
software in the application layer, and vice versa, by using an Application Program 
Interface (API) in order to enable (or disable) OSEK algorithms. 
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Fig. 2-14. OSEK Network Management. 
The protocol specific algorithms are responsible for handling data transfer on 
the network by communicating with the datalink layer. NM can also communicate 
with the interaction layer via a COM interaction layer interface for message 
deadline monitoring which is briefly discussed in the following subsection. OSEK- 
NM is now a published ISO standard: ISO 17356-5: 2006. It provides standardized 
features which ensure the functionality of inter-networking by using standardized 
interfaces. NM implementations are incorporated in all networked nodes. This 
means that a solution for NM can be implemented throughout the varieties of 
available ECU hardware. The status of the network is recorded and evaluated in all 
ECUs and thus each node features a determined behaviour regarding the network 
and the application concerned. 
NM features two mechanisms for network monitoring-a direct network 
management by using dedicated messages with a token principle and an 
indirect 
network management by monitoring application messages. 
The use of these 
mechanisms is dependent on a particular system. 
Processing of information 
collected by these mechanisms must 
be in accordance with requirements of the 
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entire networked system. The essential task of NM is to ensure the safety and the 
reliability of a communication between ECUs. An ECU is expected to provide the 
following certain features: 
0 accessibility for authorised entities; 
* maximum tolerance to temporary failures; 
0 support of network-related diagnostic features. 
2.4.1 Direct Network Management (DNM) 
Dedicated NM messages are used in DNM: Ring, Alive and Limp Home messages. 
The rate of NM communication is controlled across the network to minimize bus 
and resource consumption. Each node is monitored by other nodes on the network. 
Nodes also transmit and receive NM messages via a logical ring in which a 
communication sequence for synchronization is defined. Each node on the network 
has a unique ID normally available from I to 255. To set up a logical ring, a Ring 
message is sequentially passed from the lowest to the highest ID node which then 
passes the Ring back to the lowest ID node, as illustrated in Fig. 2-15. DNM also 
requires a broadcast type of network implementation so that every node can hear 
the messages that are being sent [90]. 
ECUI ---------- ECU2 --------- ECU3 
----------- Logical rings 
r23 Ring Message 
S> S: source 
D: destination 
Network I 
ýjGate 
n: node ID Way 2 
'd Network 2 
1>2 2>3 
ECUl --------- ECU2 --------- ECU3 4 fr -4> 1L 
Fig. 2-15. DNM logical ring. 
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Each NM message is composed into a Network Management Protocol Data 
Unit (NMPDU) which contains all information required for network management. 
According to Fig. 2-16, the first field of the NMPDU is the source node ID which 
indicates the node that has sent the NM message or the node that is to transmit an 
NM message to a receiving node. The second field is the destination node ID which 
identifies the destination of the message. The third field is the operation code 
(OpCode) which defines the type of the NMPDU: 4 Ring message types, 2 Alive 
message types and 2 Limp Home message types. The last field is an optional field 
called data field which contains data specific to applications. However, the OpCode 
can be different depending on requirements of system developers. An NMPDU is 
mapped into a protocol specific frame such as CAN and then transmitted on the 
network. 
Fig. 2-17 depicts an example of mapping an NMPDU of a Ring message from 
source node I to destination node 2 into an 11 -bit CAN message. An Alive 
message identifies a new node present on the network and puts the system into a 
transient state. When the new node has identified all nodes on the network, the 
system changes into a stable state where the NM component is fully aware of the 
status of all nodes on the network. A node not functioning properly transmits a 
Limp Home message cyclically until: (i) it is able to receive NM messages from 
other nodes correctly; or (ii) NM component stops; or (iii) the bus goes to sleep 
mode. Then the node enters a reset state and performs an NM initialization. Other 
nodes that have received a Limp Home message update their configurations to 
identify the malfunction node being absent from the bus. 
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.4 Mandatory"-------Io-- -4 Optional No. 
Address Field Control Field Data Field 
Source ID I Destination ID OpCode Data 
Fig. 2-16. NMPDU. 
Applications can obtain current network status by requesting NM to provide the 
network status it has acquired. There are two types of status available: standard 
status and extended status. Table 2-1 shows standard network status details 
recommended by OSEK/VDX. It is obvious that message transmission of DNM 
provides useful information on network and node status. Nonetheless,, the DNM 
approach may not be suitable for some systems in which simple software 
algorithms and computational resource consumption are of concern. OSEK/VDX 
therefore defines Indirect Network Management as an alternative mechanism for 
network management. 
2.4.2 Indirect Network Management (IDNM) 
IDNM is defined by OSEK as an alternative mechanism for applications that 
require simple network management. Instead of dedicated NM messages 
circulating in a logical ring, application messages are monitored by nodes that 
receive the messages to determine the status of the transmitting node. There are 
four node states, described in Table 2-2, which represent states of a node when it is 
functioning as a transmitter or a receiver. 
CAN message ID DLC I CAN Data field 
Base ID 
=Source ID 4 Destination IDI OpCode I Data I Data 
412121 oxxx I oxxx 
'W Bit level 
I Ox5Ol I OxO4 I OxO2 I OxO2 I oxxx I oxxx I 
Fig. 2-17. Mapping an NMPDU into a CAN message. 
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Table 2-1. DNM Standard Network Status. 
Bit Description 
0 Present network configuration-0: Not stable; 1: Stable 
I Operating mode of network interface-0: No error; 1: Error 
2 NM operation mode-0: NMPassive; 1: NMActive 
3 NM mode-0: NMOn; 1: NMOff 
4 NM Limp Home mode-0: Not in LimpHome; 1: LimpHome 
5 NM Bus Sleep mode-0: Not in BusSleep; 1: BusSleep 
6 NM Waiting For Bus Sleep-0: Not waiting; 1: waiting 
7 Using of Ring Data-0: Allowed; 1: Not allowed 
8 Service GotoMode last call-0: Awake called; 1: BusSleep called 
Table 2-2. IDNM Node States. 
States Definition 
Not Mute Message was transmitted successfully 
Mute Message was not transmitted within a defined period 
Not Mute Statically Message was transmitted successfully 
Mute Statically Message was not transmitted over several defined periods 
Present Message was received successfully 
Absent Message was not received within a defined period 
Present Statically Message was received successfully 
Absent Statically Message was not received over several defined periods 
In addition, two message monitoring methods are defined: a single timeout for 
observation (TOB) for all messages and an individual timeout per message. Single 
TOB is used by all nodes for monitoring monitored application messages to 
identify the node states. For instance, if a node is able to successfully transmit its 
monitored application message within TOB, the node is considered as "Not Mute". 
If monitored messages are successfully received before TOB elapses, the 
monitored node (the node that sent the messages) is "Present", shown in Fig. 2-18. 
For an individual timeout per message, IDNM uses COM Deadline 
Monitoring, a feature of OSEK Communication Component, to monitor individual 
message timeouts. If a monitored message has not arrived within predefined time, 
COM component will signal NM to update its configuration to indicate that the 
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monitored node is "Absent". Similarly, the COM component also signals NM if the 
local node has failed to transmit a message within a predefined time. As a result, that 
local node is classified as "Mute" 
To identify the static states (extended states), a specific counter and a threshold 
level are used. A counter is incremented and decremented in accordance with a 
node state. For instance, if the node is "Absent", the counter will be incremented; if 
the node resumes being "Present" again, the counter will be decremented. When 
the counter reaches the threshold, NM identifies this state as "Node Absent 
Statically". NM modes, state transitions and timer definitions are also defined in 
the OSEK NM standard. Further details of OSEK NM can be found in [89,90]. 
2.4.3 Diagnostics support 
NM supports the existing on-board diagnostic applications by providing status 
information of NM and configuration information such as an ECU in "limp-home", 
44present", or "mute" mode. The traditional use of NM is that diagnostic 
applications request network status and configuration information from NM. 
However, error history or root cause diagnostic results are not available. 
Fm-sd-l Fm-sa-I Timeout 
AAA 
ý.. C_o. u_nte. r 
................................................. 
Threshol-d 
...................... -------------------------------------------- ------------- - 
Node state 
Present 
Extended node state 
Static present I Static 
Fig. 2-18. Application message monitoring for IDNM. 
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After gathering the network status and information, diagnostic applications log 
network-related Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) according to a DTC description 
specified by the manufacturer. Despite this, to date where on-board vehicle 
diagnostics has been developed, this has been designed to activate "limp-home 
modes", and to log DTCs for later off-board fault diagnostics and rectification at 
service centres. However, in a modem vehicle where a large number of ECUs are 
networked, only making use of DTCs set by the applications for off-board vehicle 
diagnostics inevitably results in difficulties in correctly locating faulty ECUs or 
hardware components. This problem is therefore addressed in this thesis and is 
discussed further in the following chapters. 
2.5 Fault diagnostics of in-vehicle electronic systems 
As more ECUs and software contents are introduced in today's vehicles, 
overall system complexity increases, in turn raising the likelihood for unpredicted 
or emergent behaviour that could not have been anticipated during the system 
design, development, and test and validation cycle. Fig. 2-19 illustrates the 
evolution of vehicle diagnostics together with the system complexity trend 
previously introduced in Fig. 2-7. 
Vehicle diagnostics with only conventional instruments, which has been used 
for simple measurement of normal or faulty electrical signals, is no longer 
effective. Enhanced in-vehicle diagnostic methods have been introduced in order 
that root causes of faults occurring during vehicle operation are efficiently detected 
and identified. For instance, OBD, which was initially intended for emission 
monitoring, is now able to provide logged DTCs and real-time signal measurement 
for off-board diagnostics purpose of other non-emission related functions. 
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Fig. 2-19. Evolution of diagnostic test equipment (adapted from [81]). 
In-vehicle electronic and software control systems can operate on a number of 
different levels: (i) component level-individual ECUs, sensors, actuators and 
components; (ii) functional or feature level-such as braking, cruise control, 
stability control; (iii) network level-such as system-wide coordination and 
configuration, network wake-up and sleep, inter-network gateways and the network 
itself As illustrated in Fig. 2-20, a diagnostic application in each level monitors 
different parameters. For instance, the diagnostic application in the component 
level monitors input and output signals and the battery voltage. ECU's internal 
operation and communication are monitored by the ones in the feature and the 
network levels respectively. Once faults are detected, tested and confirmed, some 
default or alternative signal values are used by the ECU in a "limp-home" mode. 
The diagnostic processor then provides a warning to the driver as well as logging 
DTCs and additional environment parameters e. g. speed, temperature, timestamp 
etc. It should be noted that there are currently no actual processors in deployment. 
The diagnostic processor illustrated in Fig. 2-20 is a sub-function in each ECU. 
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Fig. 2-20. Diagnostic scheme for in-vehicle electronic systems. 
A flow chart of conventional vehicle diagnostics is shown in Fig. 2-21. The 
logged DTCs are accessed off-board by a diagnostic tool at a service centre and can 
be appropriately deleted once the faults are found and rectified. If any further 
information about the vehicle repair is needed, the off-board diagnostic tool can be 
connected to another service centre or the manufacturer's central diagnostic 
knowledge base in order to request remote assistance. 
Local faults 
detected 
Local faults 
detected 
Local faults 
detected 
Local faults 
detected 
DT s DTCs IDTCs IDTCs 
I og ed VV logged 
A 
Malfunction Indicators 
activated 
DTCs read off-board by] 
ýl a diagnostic tool 
Manual diagnostics 
guided by flowcharts/rules 
(F) = Possible root cause 
DTC DTC DTC 
cCcCccccccc 
I Repair actions I 
Fig. 2-21. Flowchart of conventional diagnostics. 
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Component andjeature levels 
In the component and feature levels, diagnostic applications employ different 
methods for detecting functional software and physical hardware faults. Input and 
output signals from sensors and actuators are monitored. Internal ECU's operation 
is checked when the ECU is initialised, operating or controlling the vehicle, and 
after the ECU finishing its operation e. g. engine is switched off. 
Many pieces of work have shown methods for diagnosing root causes of faults 
in distributed electronic systems in vehicles. An intelligent diagnostic system (IDS) 
was developed in [91] for diagnosis of component faults in a multi-ECU 
environment by using model-based reasoning (MBR), and information taken from 
failure modes and effects analysis worksheet (FMEA). This work tried to isolate a 
core faulty component instead of simply returning a series of faults. The system 
was tested by a particular list of test cases and was capable of identifying all 
scenarios in the list with 100% success rate. Murphey et al., presented the 
distributed diagnostic agent system (DDAS), a novel diagnostic architecture 
developed for automotive fault diagnosis [92]. The DDAS, implemented for fault 
detection of ECU signals, consists of a vehicle diagnostic agent (VDA) and a 
number of signal diagnostic agents (SDAs), each of which is responsible for 
diagnosing one particular automotive signal using either a single or multiple 
signals. A novel fuzzy learning algorithm was implemented to learn to classify 
good and bad signal segments by supervised learning from good examples only in 
the training data set. This work used a CBR approach in the VDA agent to find the 
cause of vehicle faults, by which effective diagnostic results have been obtained. 
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Network level 
A number of research experiments on network design, verification and test to 
prevent network level faults and to improve reliability have been reported such as 
[93 - 99]. Hardware- in-the-loop facilities are playing an increasingly important role 
in the testing of network electronic systems [100 - 105]. Methods more specific to 
network level testing have been discussed [106 - 108]. This has provided 
manufacturers with testing approaches with some degree of test coverage and 
system validation. Despite this, it is inevitable that unexpected faults can still occur 
due to untested conditions or worn components. Network level faults can result 
from a number of causes. As illustrated in Fig. 2-22, failures within an in-vehicle 
electronic system can manifest themselves in many different ways and on a number 
of different levels. The causes can be directly from the network level itself or 
indirectly from the other two levels. For instance, if a message is not transmitted 
from an ECU as specified, this problem can be caused by an internal function in the 
ECU itself (feature level), the CAN controller or the electrical wiring (component 
level). It is noted that physical hardware faults of in-vehicle networks such as short- 
circuit-to-ground or battery of CAN cables are considered as component level 
faults mentioned previously. 
Local fault diagnostics in ECU 
Component 
1 Feature 
3 0- 
Network 
DTCs 
Off-board 
ana ysis at DTC, s 
service 
centers 
DTCs 
Fig. 2-22. Impact of failure across different diagnostic levels. 
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Network level diagnostic applications in ECUs are responsible for detecting 
simple message communication errors such as communication losses between 
ECUs. Conventional network level fault detection ranges from simple application 
message monitoring to more robust and complicated network and ECU status 
monitoring e. g. OSEK DNM. Diagnostic applications gather network status and 
information from NM, where implemented, and log network-re levant DTCs which 
are commonly standardised to have a prefix 'U'. Again, these DTCs provide 
guidance to engineers to find out root causes; however, this can be inefficient, 
which is discussed in the following section. Some examples of network-re levant 
DTCs are shown below. 
U0003: "High speed CAN communication bus (+) Open" 
UO 100: "Lost communication with ECU A" 
U0301: "Software incompatibility with ECU B" 
U0401: "Invalid data received from ECU U 
2.6 Discussion 
This subsection discusses how to promptly respond to the rapid expansion of in- 
vehicle electronic systems in terms of diagnostics capability. 
Traditional vehicle diagnostics using DTCs intended for later off-board root 
cause analysis and repair actions can be unwieldy when dealing with a system 
comprising a large number of ECUs and messages. For instance, several 
components in the system or communication path can cause a DTC U0401 to be 
set. The data might have been sent correctly by the "ECU C" but it was probably 
corrupted on the bus due to intermittent faults in the cable wires. When performing 
off-board diagnostics, it is almost impossible to simulate the same operating 
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condition as when the faults were present. This would lead to time-consuming 
diagnostics and incorrect component replacement. Table 2-3 provides a summary 
of the current deployment and status of the conventional diagnostic capability 
which is to be improved by the proposed framework. 
Furthermore, not all network problems or error conditions occur persistently; 
rather, some faults slowly or intermittently develop such as communication errors 
due to loose physical connectors, known as incipient faults. It is therefore possible 
that the underlying network problems or error conditions can go un-diagnosed 
because they are mostly ignored by traditional diagnostic applications. For 
instance, on a CAN bus, despite the presence of error frames, provided that the 
overall communication is within acceptable limits e. g. a message received within 
specified time, diagnostic applications will not set and log any DTCs. The ignored 
incipient problems could later cause disruption on the whole network. This thesis 
takes into account the condition of in-vehicle message communication, so-called 
"network health". 
It is therefore suggested that the conventional framework for vehicle 
diagnostics should be improved. Fault information from all diagnostic levels should 
not be separately analysed off-board. Faults will have to be managed in a way that 
Table 2-3. Summarv of conventional diamostics. 
Capability Current deployment and status 
Fault detection Faults in three diagnostic levels monitored locally 
Logged data DTCs with snap shot data 
Fault diagnostics Off-board, rule-based and experience-based 
Proprietary tools Required 
Efficiency Time consuming when dealing with intermittent faults and 
complicated systems 
Prognostics N/A 
Scalability New DTCs/ruIes added to ECUs and diagnostic tools updated 
Transferable data & N/A 
data transparency 
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does not require immediate return-to-dealership repair actions, and enables a 
vehicle to remain in a drivable condition. This requires a paradigm shift from the 
traditional off-board dealership-based diagnostics and repair to on-board 
autonomous or remote ly-assi sted diagnostics. The work in this thesis is intended to 
address the limitation of traditional vehicle diagnostics mentioned previously, 
specifically focusing on the network level. Faults should be handled in real-time 
and in network-wide perspective since impact of failure spreads across all 
diagnostic levels as depicted in Fig. 2-23. This will be a key element for a 
realisation of on-board whole-vehicle diagnostic systems. 
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Fig. 2-23. Whole vehicle diagnostics. 
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Chapter 3 
System requirements and the proposed 
framework 
This chapter defines system requirements and presents a new framework for on- 
board network level diagnostics-a key element for a realisation of on-board 
whole-vehicle diagnostic systems [ 109]. 
3.1 System requirements 
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, the work in this thesis is intended to 
address the limitation of conventional vehicle diagnostics at the network level. In 
order to handle network level faults on-board, the following requirements of the 
new diagnostic system are specified. 
* The system accommodates network level faults on-board by monitoring the 
network, and utilising existing signals and information available from the 
network and the other diagnostic levels; 
* If specified faults are detected, a diagnostic function isolates and diagnoses 
possible root causes, and store the causes in a fault database; 
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e The data format of the database is 'open' so that it can be easily accessed by 
other systems such as a whole-vehicle fault management system or an off- 
board diagnostic tool without requiring specific tools or data interpretation 
systems; 
9 The technologies implemented in the system are efficient yet simple and 
cost-effective. 
3.1.1 Design options 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the general FDI-FD scheme has been playing 
an important role in fault detection and diagnosis in various engineering 
applications. The scheme provides a very good guideline for constructing a 
diagnostic system. Therefore the network level diagnostic system is designed to 
conform to the scheme. 
According to the scheme, fault diagnosis is knowledge- intensive and can be 
generally divided into two main categories: model-based approaches and data- 
driven approaches. The former relies upon the accuracy of the system model 
whereas the latter is based on inference of historical data, or experience and skills 
of technicians or engineers. Since there are different types of data fed into the 
diagnostic module, i. e. message rates are numerical, NM status is Boolean, and 
DTCs are text-based data, the diagnostic method deployed must be able to handle 
such different data types and efficiently provide correct diagnoses. In this case, to 
create and modify an accurate model representing the communication behaviour 
can be rather difficult. Knowledge-based reasoning systems have shown success in 
providing more precise and understandable diagnoses, especially when 
dealing 
with different input data types [27]. More importantly, the advantage 
is the 
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convenience of updating diagnostic information. Hence, a data-driven and 
reasoning diagnostic approach to network diagnosis was chosen to be explored. 
Regarding the data storage format, a unified data storage format for heuristic 
diagnostic knowledge is required since original information can be recorded in 
different formats. In this work, the information in different formats is unified to an 
XML (extensible mark-up language) format. XML is especially designed to make 
infonnation extensible, transferable and portable, providing a convenient way in 
which to edit the knowledge base. In addition, XML is being adopted in standards of 
data exchange in automotive and industrial applications. For instance, firstly, FIBEX 
(Field Bus Exchange Format) uses XML schema-based data format to describe 
complete vehicle network containing the most commonly used elements for data 
exchange between automotive tools [I 10]. Secondly, an adaptive Internet integration 
of Field Bus Systems has been introduced where a new approach to eliminating 
interoperability problems of Field Bus solutions by representing messages in XML 
format is implemented [I I I]. 
3.1.2 Technical specification 
The system is designed to meet the requirements discussed above. Since CAN 
networks are concerned in this thesis, the technical specification of the diagnostic 
system are as follows. 
0 Fault detection of II -bit CAN ID and can be flexibly extended to 29-bit; 
Detection of faults on periodic messages; 
9 Maximum fault-free message rate of each message is 100 msg/s; 
0 Format of raw data of diagnostic knowledge: text-based 
format, VectorTM 
message database format (*. dbc); 
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* False alarm rate (rf,, ): the number of incorrectly detected faults divided by 
total fault cases < 10%; 
0 Missed fault rate (r. f): for each fault, the total number of undetected faults 
divided by the total number of times that the fault case occurs < 10%; 
0 True detection/isolation rate (rd, r, j): for a particular fault case, the number 
of times it is correctly detected/isolated, divided by total number of times 
the fault case occurs > 90%; 
* Mean detection/isolation delay (T? nd, Tmi): for a particular fault case, the 
average detection/isolation delay time < 10 ms; 
* Initial 65,536 case IDs which can be extended, by using extra memory; 
e DTC gathering based on ISO-14229 standard; 
9 Direct and Indirect OSEK Network Management compatible. 
3.2 Proposed framework 
The framework defines a means of enhancing real-time vehicle diagnostics at the 
network level, by deploying the general FDI-FD scheme and knowledge-based 
diagnosis. The concept and the structure of the framework are described in this 
section. 
As illustrated in Fig. 3-1, the structure of the framework is designed to conform 
to the general FDl-FD scheme and can be divided into three main sections: 
9 Network interface section containing a network interface module; 
o Diagnostic section involving a diagnostic module; 
o Information section consisting of a knowledge base storing information 
converted from fault information documents and a fault database. 
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Fig. 3-1. Framework for on-board network level diagnostics. 
3.2.1 Network interface module 
The network interface module is responsible for detecting network level faults. As 
shown in Fig. 3-2, after initialising software variables and retrieving message 
specifications, the network interface module monitors message communication on 
a network and sends an error notification to the diagnostic module after faults are 
detected. 
Main Start 
Initiaiise 
variables 
Get message specification 
e. g. message IDs, Rates etc. 
Network fault 
detection 
Store detected faults' details in cases 
Notify the diagnostic module 
Fig. 3-2. Flowchart for the network interface module. 
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Network level faults considered in this thesis include permanent, transient and 
intermittent faults. These different fault types are distinguished by their occurrence 
durations. Permanent faults are anomalous conditions that are present and remain 
on a network until the causes are found and repaired, such as lost communication 
due to broken wiring. Transient faults are faults that occur for a very short period of 
time and then disappear (over a particular period). For example, a transient voltage 
drop or spike induced by electromagnetic fields during vehicle cranking (when a 
starter motor is turning). Intermittent faults are defined as faults that happen 
randomly over time, such as a message loss caused by a loose electrical connector. 
In contrast to the conventional fault monitoring scheme for in-vehicle networks, 
which is localised for an individual ECU within the network, it is proposed in this 
framework that the interaction and communication behaviour on the whole network 
are monitored in a network-wide perspective. Small faults slowly developing, 
known as incipient faults, are also taken into account. Message rates and protocol- 
specific error signals, e. g. a number of error frames on CAN are monitored in real- 
time. As illustrated in Fig. 3-3, the network interface module receives different 
input variables from the network such as message rates, error frames, NM and 
network-re levant DTCs. If faults are detected, symptoms are generated and stored 
to be diagnosed by the diagnostic module. 
Notification 
Network 
Network Variables Interface 
Module Symptoms 
Fig. 3-3. Network interface module. 
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In general, the types of message in terms of its transmission time are twofold: 
sporadic and periodic messages. A sporadic message is only transmitted when it is 
requested from other ECUs, such as a diagnostic response message. In contrast, a 
periodic message is transmitted repeatedly at a specified rate, e. g. most of the 
messages for vehicle control. The message rate is generally specified by the 
manufacturer during the network design process and is defined in a message 
database. Fig. 3-4 illustrates a fault-free CAN message being transmitted on a 
network at every 10 ms or 100 msg/s. Whilst only periodic messages are focused in 
this thesis, potential extended work on FDl for sporadic messages is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
The network interface module monitors and processes message rate variations 
of the entire network, so-called network-wide monitoring. Fig. 3-5 depicts a 
statistics window illustrating some messages and error frames being transmitted on 
a CAN bus, and the message rate and error frame monitoring suggested to be 
implemented in the network interface module. 
Fig. 3-4. Fault-free CAN message transmitted at 100 msg/s. 
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Fig. 3-5. Message rate monitoring in the network interface module. 
v 
The number of error frames can instantly indicate the condition of the network, 
i. e. the greater the number of error frames, the worse the network condition in 
terms of communication failure. The preliminary investigation into variation of the 
number of error frames with different disturbances presented in Chapter 5 shows that 
the relationship between the number of error frames and the network condition is 
mostly nonlinear. Despite that, an intelligent data classification such as a fuzzy 
inference system (FIS) can be implemented as a pre-diagnostic system to classify 
the error signals into different conditions representing "network health". These 
classified signals are fed to the main diagnostic module for further diagnostics or 
prognostics 
Network level fault detection techniques based on existing standards or system- 
specific techniques can be implemented within the network interface module. One 
such existing standard is the OSEK NM which provides diagnostic applications 
with network status. An improved network fault detection using this standard 
together with other system-specific techniques is discussed in the next chapter. 
A 
Error frame monitoring 
100. 
90, 
$0. 
70. 
60. 
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The framework also involves utilisation of conventional network-relevant 
DTCs which are locally set and stored in an ECUs' memory after faults have been 
detected and confirmed in a conventional on-board diagnostic process. These DTCs 
provide additional fault information at the component and the feature levels such as 
"CAN Bus Short Circuit to Ground". DTCs from any ECUs which may have 
caused or detected communication errors can be gathered on demand by using 
standard diagnostic commands e. g. ISO 14229 [112], which is presented in the next 
chapter. 
In short, the main working steps of the network interface module are as 
follows: 
0 Step 1: detect network level faults and monitor error signals-message 
communication faults and error frames on CAN; 
& Step 2: if faults or error signals are detected, create and store current faults 
to be diagnosed by the diagnostic module; 
0 Step 3: if a pre-diagnostic system is implemented, classify detected error 
signals into smaller groups; 
* Step 4: notify the diagnostic module of the faults. 
3.2.2 Diagnostic module 
The diagnostic module, illustrated in Fig. 3-6, must be capable of diagnosing or 
identifying root cause(s) or component(s) that may have caused the network 
level 
faults detected by the fault detection in the network interface module. 
The diagnostic module is notified by the network interface module after 
network level faults are detected. The network 
interface module passes detailed 
data (or symptoms) of the detected faults to the diagnostic module 
for diagnosis. 
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After completing the diagnostic process, the diagnostic module stores diagnostic 
results in the fault database. 
As mentioned previously, there are different types of data fed into the 
diagnostic module, the diagnostic method deployed must be able to handle such 
different data types and efficiently provide correct diagnostic results. A data-driven 
and reasoning diagnostic approach using knowledge-based diagnosis is selected to 
be implemented. This is intended to suit the dynamic requirements of the 
automotive domain. In particular, when new messages are introduced into a vehicle 
electronic system as a result of additional features, existing diagnostic information 
in the knowledge base can be conveniently updated. 
Although it is anticipated that higher memory space and processing time for 
such real-time diagnostic applications are required, it seems promising that on- 
board knowledge-based diagnostic systems can still be realised because microchips 
have been becoming more powerful yet cheaper [113]. The expense of faster 
microcontrollers and higher memory can be financially worthwhile, even for the 
resource-sensitive automotive domain,, especially when considering expected 
reduction in warranty costs and improvement of customer satisfaction for the 
upcoming more complex in-vehicle electronic systems. 
(D 
Notification 
Diagnostic Its, Module 
Symptoms 
Fig. 3-6. Diagnostic module. 
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3.2.3 Knowledge base and fault database 
Knowledge base 
In order to achieve precise diagnostics, a dependable knowledge base containing 
correct information is required. Making use of available fault infon-nation in an 
efficient way is the main objective in building the knowledge base in this framework. 
The knowledge base should contain information on possible faults on a network. it is 
suggested in this framework that the available infon-nation from the network FMEA 
documents (manufacturers and device suppliers), message specification and test data 
should be used in building a knowledge base. 
FMEA is a formalised method developed by reliability engineers for predicting 
system responses to failures of system components, assemblies and sub-systems. 
All components in a system are analysed to identify possible failure modes and the 
effects of each failure on system performance. An FMEA document is a worksheet,, 
illustrated in Table 3-1, in which there are columns such as component, failure 
mode, possible cause(s), effects of failure, failure code, corrective actions, etc. 
Although creating an FMEA worksheet can be time-consuming, the strength of 
FMEA is that it drives a systematic analysis of potential failures. Table 3-2 shows a 
generic FMEA for communication networks utilising OSI 7-layer model expanded 
with specific CAN network failure modes. 
Table 3-1. FMEA worksheet. 
Effects 
Component Failure mode Possible Code Corrective 
causes On Unit On system Actions 
Connector Bad connection Corrosion Signals not Lost signals 0001 Clean/replace 
received the component 
correctly 
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In vehicle design processes, FMEA documents of in-vehicle networks are 
created by manufacturers for quality control purposes. The suppliers also provide 
the manufacturers with information of possible failures and possible causes as a 
guideline to solve network problems. The information contained in the FMEA 
documents is very useful for diagnostic systems. Such infon-nation, however, is 
traditionally recorded in different formats e. g. paper-based documents, Text files, 
Excel filesl etc. Hence, it is necessary to have a document converter to convert those 
documents into the same electronic-based fon-nat whereby interoperability and data 
exchange can be achieved. As discussed previously, XML is used to perform this 
conversion. 
Fig. 3-7 illustrates how a knowledge base is constructed using existing 
information from the suggested sources, and its generic structure. The conditions of 
each fault experienced are collected and hierarchically structured case by case. A 
case is indexed by a case identification (Case ID) to which the potential causes are 
linked. For instance,, by obtaining the information in Table 3-1, a case in the 
knowledge base can be constructed as follows: 
Case 1: 
Conditionl: Timeout flag = 1; (Signals not received correctly) 
Potential cause 1: 
Description: Bad connection at Connector I 
Fault Code: 0001 
Potential cause 2: 
Description: Problem at Wire I 
Fault Code: 0002 
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Fig. 3-7. Building knowledge base and its structure. 
Fault database 
The fault database is for storage of diagnostic results and relevant fault 
information e. g. fault codes and their details, shown in Fig. 3-8. The database can 
be accessed by either an on-board whole-vehicle fault management system, if 
implemented, or an external off-board diagnostic tool. A memory structure for the 
storage can be flexibly designed, depending upon a requirement of the 
implemented diagnostic method, such as the XML-formatted fault database for a 
case-based reasoning diagnostic system presented in the next chapter. 
Access from on-board fault management 
or 
off-board diagnostic tools 
Diagnostic results 
Fig. 3-8. Fault database. 
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Fault database 
A generic structure of the fault database is suggested in this chapter, which is 
shown in Fig. 3-9. The structure of the fault database should contain the following: 
o Case ID is a numerical value which indexes a case sequence; 
0 General Description describes the fault case in general; 
* Time Stamp gives a time record when a particular fault is diagnosed; 
* Fault Details provide detailed description of a particular fault. Fault code, 
possible fault cause(s) and test method(s) are also described as follows. 
o Fault code is an index which indicates specific fault symptoms. 
Faults on different messages or ECUs can have similar symptoms. 
For instance,, a "missing-message" and "ECU does not respond to 
diagnostic message" symptoms can happen to any message and any 
ECU respectively; 
o Possible fault causes consist of a list of components which may have 
caused the detected faults; 
o Test methods provide guidance of test procedures which should be 
conducted to confirm the diagnostic results or to repair the faulty 
components as well as reconfiguring software. 
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Fig. 3-9. Fault database structure. 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the system requirements, and presented 
the concept and the structure of the new framework for on-board vehicle 
diagnostics focusing on enhancing the diagnostics scheme at the network level. The 
framework introduces a means by which network level faults are monitored, 
detected and diagnosed on-board at an entire ly-network-wide perspective. The next 
chapter demonstrates an implementation of an on-board network level diagnostic 
system based on the proposed framework. 
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Chapter 4 
An implementation of on-board 
network level diagnostics 
This chapter discusses how an on-board network level diagnostic system, based on 
the proposed framework introduced in Chapter 3, can be realised. Enhanced 
techniques newly developed in this thesis, and existing technologies and 
methodologies that can be potentially deployed in developing the diagnostic system 
are discussed. Network level fault detection, diagnosis using CBR, and suggested 
structures of a knowledge base and a fault database are demonstrated through an 
implementation of RINDS-Real-time In-vehicle Network Diagnostic Systems. 
Implementation steps involved three major sequential experiments on CAN 
networks [ 17,109,114,115], which are presented in the next chapter. 
Fig. 4-1 shows the designed structure of RINDS, which consists of the three 
main sections defined in the framework. In this thesis, RINDS is specially designed 
as a central diagnostic system that monitors and diagnoses network level faults on a 
CAN network. Despite this, local diagnostic information from ECUs (the 
component and feature levels), e. g. network-re levant DTCs, remains in use. RINDS 
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Fig. 4-1. RINDS structure. 
will not replace diagnostic information at the component or feature levels; rather it 
will provide additional and useful information on message communication and 
interaction between ECUs. For instance, a particular local component level DTC in 
an engine management ECU can only be interpreted as "lost communication with 
anti-lock braking system". By deploying CBR, RINDS will provide network level 
1ý 
information "why communication is lost" and "what are the likely cause(s) . 
Although in this thesis RINDS is implemented in a separate simulated ECU, in 
practice the system could be hosted in an existing hardware platform. For example, 
the system can be integrated in an ECU embedded in a gateway such as an 
instrument panel which is often connected to both CAN-HS and CAN-LS. 
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4.1 Network level fault detection 
Network level fault detection resides in the network interface module, illustrated in 
Fig. 4-2. The module is fed with four input variables: message rates, error frames, 
NM and network-re levant DTCs. Any change or deviation of the first three 
variables is monitored by the fault detection. The network-relevant DTCs are used 
to help the diagnostic module make diagnosis decision. 
4.1.1 Message rates and error frames 
CAN application message faults, shown in Fig. 4-3, which are most likely to occur 
on in-vehicle networks are to be detected by the detection system. The faults are 
defined in detail in Table 4-1. In general, details of periodic messages are specified 
in a message database during a design process. For example, a message 'M' is 
transmitted by an ECU 'E' at every 10 ms. This transmission period can be 
guaranteed by use of special network software tools. However, message faults can 
still happen when the bus traffic quality is poor due to a large number of error 
frames, or in a system where no such special software tools are implemented in 
ECUs. It is critical when faults occur on messages which are used in real-time 
control loops. Therefore, network level fault detection becomes necessary to 
monitor the number of messages and their timings, and the number of error frames 
actually present on the network. 
Message Rates 
Error frames Network 
Interface 
NM Module 
Network DTCs 
Fig. 4-2. Network interface module and its inputs. 
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Fig. 4-3. CAN message fault scenarios used in this implementation. 
An application message on the network is periodically monitored in a time 
window T,, (e. g. 100 ms as shown in Fig. 4-3). The intermediate message rate N,, i 
(in msg/s) is compared to the rate specified in a message database Nj and a 
threshold value Nj, where i is a message identification number. T,, is calculated by 
the following. 
Tw 
where n=0 to the last message ID. 
Table 4-1. Details of application message faults. 
Faults Details 
Fault free Message is sent at the specified rate ( N, - N, -< 
N,,, < N, + Nj) 
F I: Timeout Message is not sent within predefined time (Nm = 0) 
F2: Missing-Message Message is missing in a particular period (Nm < Ns - Nt) 
F3: Too-Many-MeSsage Too many messages are transmitted (Nm > Ns + Nt) 
F4: Lost NM NM message is lost (not shown in Fig. 4-3) 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ISO 11898 standard is commonly used for 
CAN-HS applications. Fig. 4-4 shows a signal on a CAN-HS bus captured by a 
digital oscilloscope, where the bit stuffing rule is applied i. e. an opposite logic bit is 
inserted after five consecutive bits with the same logic. For instance, as shown in 
Fig. 4-4!, `P is inserted (represented by 'S') after five consecutive '0' bits. 
An error frame is transmitted when any of the communication error types is 
detected by an error management unit fitted in a CAN controller. These error types 
can be caused by a number of reasons one of which is the physical disturbance. 
When CAN buses are installed in a vehicle, there can be a situation where the 
physical wiring or connectors can be damaged or gradually deteriorated by 
vibration or corrosion. This would cause the electrical signal to vary from 
specifications, thereby resulting in communication failures and error frames being 
transmitted. 
Run 
r: 4 
u 
M 40.0 
Dominant Physical signals on the network (CAN_H to GND) 
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Fig. 4-4. CAN-HS signal. 
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An error frame does not have an ID and is transmitted by any ECU that has 
detected faults on an application message. These faults can be caused by problems 
in the ECU or the peripheral hardware. From the experiments conducted in this 
thesis, it can be seen the number of error frames could be used to indicate the 
network condition. In the preliminary software-based simulation, the network 
interface module simply monitors and stores the number of error frames into a fault 
case in a unit of frames/s. The use of an FIS to infer the network condition from the 
number of error frames is presented in the full system experiment. 
4.1.2 Network Management 
Apart from the application message faults, an NM fault-Lost NM generated by 
forcing an API that processes NM to stop sending NM messages-is also 
monitored. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, DNM provides network 
status-standard status and extended status-to an application which is running in 
a networked ECU environment. With DNM,, less overhead to the application is 
required and a high level of portability across multiple applications can be 
achieved. IDNK on the other hand, is much simpler to implement. Despite being 
less robust and limited availability of node and network status, IDNM is an 
alternative mechanism for systems where rapid response from NM is not necessary, 
and simple software algorithms and computational resource consumption are of 
concem. 
Traditionally, network diagnostic applications in ECUs only use either DNM or 
IDNM to provide them with node and network status. If DNM is implemented, 
some application message transmission faults such as intermittent application 
message missing cannot be detected because application messages are not 
monitored. Moreover, if NM messages are not available 
from a particular node, as 
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a result of its embedded software faults, while application messages can still be 
transmitted, diagnostic applications in other nodes will no longer be able to detect 
faults from that faulty node. Conversely, if IDNM is implemented, as mentioned 
earlier, availability of node and network status is limited. This therefore would 
result in less fault coverage in a networked ECU environment. 
To enhance coverage, robustness and continuity of network level fault detection 
which is vitally required for on-board diagnostics, the Adaptive OSEK NM 
technique is proposed in this thesis [115]. This technique is divided into two 
approaches: 
9 Switching DNM to IDNM, called Switched NM; 
* Combining DNM and IDNM, called Combined NM. 
The concept of combining both approaches is based on the fact that if the use of 
NM by applications is not fixed to DNM or IDNM, then the applications will benefit 
from using the advantages of both types of traditional OSEK NM as fault monitoring 
continues. As illustrated in Fig. 4-5, both approaches begin with variable and timer 
initialization. For Switched NM, DNM is initially used as the main NM of the system. 
If DNM is not available for some reason such as NM API failure, the IDNM mode 
will be entered i. e. application messages are monitored by a diagnostic application 
rather than using information from dedicated NM messages. For Combined NM, an 
application uses DNM and IDNM together such that application messages and NM 
messages are monitored at all time. 
Although Combined NM will inherently consume more resources than when 
traditionally using separate NM, it is expected to cover more fault scenarios, and to 
provide more accurate network fault detection and improved robustness. 
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Fig. 4-5. Adaptive OSEK NM: a) Switched NM; b) Combined NM. 
4.1.3 Network-relevant DTCs 
As defined in the proposed framework, network-re levant DTCs conventionally 
logged at the component and feature diagnostic levels can be very useful for the 
diagnostic process in the diagnostic module. Fault symptoms at the two levels such 
as "CAN bus (+) open", "Invalid data received from ECU X", etc. can help the 
diagnostic module in pinpointing the possible fault causes. When the diagnostic 
module requires this information, it can request a dedicated application in the 
network interface module to gather DTCs from ECUs by using a standard diagnostic 
service such as defined in ISO 14229. The application has to interpret raw data of 
DTCs originally obtained from ECUs because the data is in a binary format. 
A general framework for DTC gathering designed in this thesis is shown in Fig. 
4-6. Either directly obtaining DTC from ECUs or indirectly reading data from DTC 
log files from other diagnostic tools can be implemented. In this implementation, 
network DTCs are requested by the network interface module on-board; therefore 
direct DTC gathering approach using standard DTC services is used, illustrated in 
Fig. 4-7. 
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Tester 
DTC analysis 
Direct Indirect 
DTC Service Log files - 
From diagnostic 
CAN bus interface tools 
Fig. 4-6. General framework for DTC monitoring. 
Establishing diagnostic service sessions is based on ISO 14229 which specifies 
requirements of diagnostic services for road vehicles. ISO 14229 defines data link 
independent requirements of diagnostic services, which allow a diagnostic tester to 
control diagnostic functions in ECUs connected on such in-vehicle serial data links 
as the CAN-HS CAN-LS in this implementation. Generic services by which the 
diagnostic tester can stop or resume non-diagnostic message transmission on the 
data link are also specified. The vehicle diagnostic architecture of ISO 14229 
applies to a single tester that may be temporarily or permanently connected to the 
diagnostic data link and a number of ECUs. 
-----------I 
Network interfacei 
-I Tester DTC Service 
CAN bus interface 
-EC-U I-JI----------I k-FECU 
CO 
F 
C) 
ECU 
z ECU 
cn 
ECU 
Fig. 4-7. DTC gathering-Direct approach. 
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After detecting a fault and obtaining the required information, the network 
interface module stores the fault and its details as a current case and notifies the 
diagnostic module to perform diagnosis. A general case structure is shown in Fig. 
4-8. It consists of a title, case features representing particular conditions under 
consideration, and timestamp. This current case is to be diagnosed by the 
diagnostic module. Case features can be either quantitative or qualitative. For 
instance, a feature that represents a message rate can be quantitative such as 100 
msg/s, or qualitative e. g. "too-few", "too-manY" 
4.2 Fault isolation with multiple discrete events 
This section discusses a method for isolating possible faulty peripheral components 
which may cause "timeout" and "'missing-message" faults. Fault isolation with 
multiple discrete events is presented. 
In engineering systems where some basic knowledge of relationships between 
faults and symptoms is available, the knowledge can be expressed in rules based on 
fault-tree analysis (FTA) or event-tree analysis (ETA). A simple example a rule of 
'FAULT]' caused by two symptoms-'SYMPTOM]' and 'SYMPTOM2' is as 
follows: 
IF (SYMPTOM] AND SYMPTOM2) THEN ERROR] 
IF (ERROR] OR ERROR2) THEN FAULT] 
FTA is a graphical method that hierarchically represents a binary relationship 
between a fault ('top event) and symptom(s). Intermediate events relevant to the 
Title Feature I Feature 2 Feature n Timestamp 
Fig. 4-8. Current case structure. 
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'top event' are combined using logical operations. FTA is commonly used in 
hazard analysis in safety-critical systems as it can represent dependencies in the 
systems [15]. Fig. 4-9 illustrates a simple fault tree of a headlamp failure in a 
vehicle, which involves several root causes that can be traced back. FTA is also 
widely used in fault diagnosis with inference methods. Fault diagnosis can be 
preformed by inferring Boolean values of symptoms from sensor measurements 
such as pressure and position switches, and fault-symptom relationships. 
For in-vehicle network diagnostics, this section addresses how to utilise local 
message monitoring data in ECUs for isolating faulty components. Fault isolation 
with multiple discrete events by interpreting symptoms or intermediate events of 
the presence and correctness of message communication is discussed. 
Conventionally, each ECU monitors particular messages it expects to receive. 
Faulty event data such as "timeout" events of the expected messages is locally 
stored in the ECU. When faults occur in a particular component which is not in a 
communication path between a monitoring ECU and a monitored message, the 
monitoring ECU will not distinguish the faults and will not store any fault data. 
Fl: Headlamp 
does not work 
Primary 
lamp 
failure 
Primary 
ECU 
failure 
No command 
message Battery 
( 
failure 
CAN bus 
failure 
Fig. 4-9. Simple fault tree of a headlamp failure in a vehicle. 
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For instance, in the ECU diagram shown in Fig. 4-10, suppose that E5 expects MI 
from El and the other ECUs do not monitor any messages from E5. If a "timeout" 
fault of MI is detected and stored in E5, root causes can be several components in 
the communication path e. g. El, WI, Cl, W6, W7, C5, W5 and E5. This list of 
possible faulty component(s) can be narrowed down if every ECU (i) locally 
monitors particular messages from the other ECUs even if the messages are not 
used in its control functions, and (ii) can provide local fault events to be analysed 
by a dedicated diagnostic system, provided that there is a redundant 
communication channel available if the main channel is permanently unavailable. 
A communication path is shown in Fig. 4-11 where a monitoring ECU receives 
a monitored message from a monitored ECU through several peripheral 
components. The peripheral components can be classified into three major groups: 
(i) components at the monitoring ECU, (ii) at the monitored ECU and (iii) shared 
among ECUs. Consider the networked system in Fig. 4-10 where M5 is monitored 
by all ECUs, fault symptoms in a situation where M5 is not received by EI -E4 and 
MI-M4 are not received by E5 can be summarised in Table 4-2. Possible faulty 
components can be identified in relation to an individual symptom and the 
peripherals involved in the communication path. 
E: ECU 
El E3 E5 W: Wire 
C- Connector 
ý M- Message 
wi W3 
9 I 
F-C-1 W6 C3 1 W7 - -ý C2 I C4 
ECU 
W2 W4 
Applications 
E2 E4 
AN 
Bus driver 
Fig. 4-10. In-vehicle network with ECUs and peripheral components. 
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Components at the monitored ECU Shared components Components at the monitoring ECU 
Fig. 4-11. Communication path. 
Table 4-2. Fault sympton 
11 
ill ECUs except E5 itself I LUUIC. ivi-) not rece ivea Dy, 
MI M2 1M3 M4 M51 
SI JEI I I I 1 01 
S2 I E2. I I I 1 0 
S3 I E31 I I I 1 0 
S4 E4 I I I 1 0 
S5 E5 01 01 01 01 11 
where 1: Mi is received by Ej; 0: Mi is not received by Ej; Sj: Symptom i. 
As shown in Table 4-3, for instance, SI can be caused by E 1, W 1, E 1, E5, W5, 
C55 W6 and W7. After considering all of the discrete fault symptoms on the entire 
network (S I- S5), W7 is involved in every symptom; therefore it is isolated as a 
faulty component. Another example of fault isolation for multiple faults is provided 
in Table 4-4. In this example, M5 is not received by all ECUs except E5 itself; MI- 
M2 are not received by E3-E5; M3-M5 are not received by EI-E2; M3-M4 are not 
received by E5. Similarly, after considering multiple discrete fault symptoms on 
the entire network, W6 and W7 can be isolated as faulty components. 
Table 4-3. Fault isolation table r the symptoms in Ta ble 4-2. 
1 Cl E2 W2 C2 E. 3 W3 C3 E4 W4 C4 E5 W5 C5 W6 W71 
S1 I I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
S2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
S3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
S5 I I I I I I I I I I I 1 0 0 0 1 1 
P - - - - -I -I -I -I - - -I - - - -I -I x 
where 1: component is in the communication path and can cause Sj; 
0: component is not in the communication path; 
p: possible faulty components. 
78 
Table 4-4. Fault symptom table: M5 not received by al I ECUs except E5 itself, MI- 
M2 not received by E3-E5; M3-M5 not received by EI -E2; M3-M4 not received by 
E5. 
MI M2 M3 M4 M5 
SI EI 1 1 0 0 0 
S2 E2 1 1 0 0 0 
S3 E3 0 0 1 1 0 
S4 E4 0 0 1 1 0 
S5 E5 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 4-5. Fault isolatio n ta ble r the symptoms in Ta ble 4-4. 
1 CI E2 
. 
W2 C2 E3 W3 C3 E4 W4 C4 E5 W5 C5 W61 W7 
S1 I I 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S3 I I I I I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
S4 I I I I I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
S5 I I I I I I I I I I I 1 0 0 0 1 1 
P x x 
In practice, the presented fault isolation technique can be implemented in 
RINDS provided that a redundant channel is available. Multiple fault events from 
all ECUs of the entire network are gathered by RINDS through either the existing 
network itself or the redundant channel when the network is permanently 
unavailable e. g. permanently broken wires. The redundant channel can be a wired 
or wireless link among the ECUs e. g. FlexRay dual-channel topology or Bluetooth. 
Intennittent fault data can be used to represent a deterioration statistic by using a 
counter to count the number of detected faults in the component. 
4.3 Case-based reasoning (CBR) 
CBR approach enables an expert system to solve problems from its experience e. g. 
known cases in a knowledge base employed to successfully solve previous problems. 
After reaching search-based solution to a problem, a CBR system can save that 
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solution, so that when a similar situation occurs, search would not be necessary 
[116]. If two problems are similar with respect to a set of attributes S, describing 
them, then they could be similar with respect to another set of attributes S2. Case- 
based reasoners share a common structure which can be considered as a general CBR 
cycle for describing CBR methods and systems, illustrated in Fig. 4-12 [117]. 
There are four processes beginning with 'RE': Retrieve, Reuse, Revise and 
Retain. A solving process begins with retrieving one or more previous cases. Next, 
the retrieved cases are reused and revised to solve the problem. If a new case is 
found, it is then retained into the existing knowledge base. 
Problem 
Learned 
case 
Previous 
Arv, r 
Tested/ 
Repaired 
case 
General 
knowledge 
Solved 
cc aa ss ee 
le Vis 
Confirmed solution 
Suggested solution 
New 
L case /0 
L 
Retrieved 
case 
se 
Fig. 4-12. General CBR cycle (from [117]). 
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Advantages of CBR are discussed in [116,118]. For instance, firstly, CBR has 
the ability to encode historical knowledge directly. Cases can be obtained from 
existing case histories, repair logs, or other sources. This eliminates the need for 
intensive knowledge acquisition with a human expert. Secondly, CBR uses a simple 
additive model for knowledge acquisition. An appropriate case representation, a 
retrieval index and a case adaptation strategy are used. On the other hand, CBR also 
has its disadvantages. For example, normally cases do not include deeper knowledge 
of the domain. This can lead to wrong or poor quality diagnosis when the cases are 
misapplied in a diagnostic process. Another problem about a trade-off between the 
number of cases and computing time should also be taken into account. Table 4-6, 
adapted from [27], shows a comparison of different methods suitably used for data 
retrieval and reasoning. 
Table 4-6. Comparison of methods for data retrieval and reasoning. 
Method Suited Not suited 
Database 
Infon-nation retrieval 
Statistics 
Wel I -structured, standardised data, Complex, poor structured data 
and simple, precise queries possible and fuzzy queries required 
Large amount of textual data Non-textual complex data types, 
background knowledge available 
Large amount of well-understood Exploratory analysis of data with 
data with a well-formed hypothesis dependent variables 
Rule-based systems Well-understood, stable, narrow Poorly understood problem area 
problem area and justification by that constantly changes 
rule base acceptable 
Machine learning Generalised rules required from a Rules not required, and 
large training set and justification by justification by rule trace 
rule trace acceptable unacceptable 
Neural networks Noisy numerical data for pattern Complex symbolic data or when 
recognition or signal processing justification required 
CBR Poorly understood problem area with When case data not available or if 
complex structure data changing a complex adaptation required, or 
slowly with time and justification if an exact optimal answer is 
required required 
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In this work, CBR for in-vehicle network diagnostics is explored. A CBR cycle 
is deployed in the diagnostic process of RINDS, illustrated in Fig. 4-13. After 
receiving a notification from the network interface module, the diagnostic module 
classifies the error as a current case. The diagnostic module then retrieves one or 
more previous cases. Next, by using the concept of similarity between cases, if the 
retrieved cases match the current case, they are reused and revised to solve the 
current case. In contrast, if a new case is found, it needs to be revised and tested 
locally or remotely by an expert prior to being retained into the existing knowledge 
base. Eventually, the diagnostic module stores network fault codes that are relevant 
to the problem into the fault database. 
Case retrieving is achieved by comparing the similarity (SIM) between two cases. 
An exact match approach can be used in a CBR system where simple case retrieving 
is adequate. The approach calculates similarity between cases by using the equation 
4-1. If the retrieved cases match the current case, they are reused and revised to solve 
the current case. If a new case is found,, it is marked as a new case which needs to be 
revised and tested prior to being retained into the knowledge base. 
Diaanostic module 
CBR 
--. ýw01 
Fault database 
Reuse 
Knowledge base 
Previous Learned Retain 
case 
Expert 
or 
Testing 
Tested/ 
Repaired 
Retrieve 
-------- 
case 
Current Retrieved ? Current 
case case case Revise 
L---------------- 
Fig. 4-13. CBR cycle applied for RINDS. 
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I if 
SIM (a, b) = 
0 if 
where a and b are Boolean values of case's features. 
However, in a system where CBR is fully implemented, case adaptation can be 
used to adapt retrieved cases that are not exactly matched with the current case. 
The CBR with case adaptation is implemented in RINDS is surnmarised in the 
flowchart illustrated in Fig. 4-14. 
The similarity can be calculated by using: 
Sim 
= 
identical 
(identical + different) 
(4-2) 
where,, for two compared cases, "identical" is how many features that have the 
same values, and "different" is how many features that have different values (see 
Appendix B for further details). 
Notification 
received 
Extract features from 
current case 
Retrieve similar existing case(s) 
identical 
SIM = identical + different 
imilar case-> Yes 
found? 
Request remote case Adapt the retrieved case 
revision ( Store diagnosed case 
Report message 
Return to main 
task 
Fig. 4-14. Flowchart of CBR with case adaptation. 
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The diagnostic module extracts case features from an XML current case into 
binary-encoded data to perform a diagnostic process. XML tags are data descriptions 
and are not used in any part of the diagnostic process. The tags only specify where 
and what the diagnostic module retrieves case features from the knowledge base. In a 
complete CBR system, case revision and testing should be automatically done by the 
CBR process. However, in this implementation, although new cases found by the 
CBR process are locally or remotely presented to engineers or experts, this should 
not increase their workload because only new cases are presented for revision and 
testing. On the contrary, experts or engineers would not have to diagnose basic 
vehicle faults on a vehicle-to-vehicle basis if the faults can be diagnosed on-board by 
the CBR process. 
The CBR method presented here is one of the diagnostic methods which can be 
implemented in the framework. CBR is suited and therefore intended to deal with 
various types of variables gathered from the network e. g. Boolean fault flags, number 
of error frames, and text-based DTCs. Different diagnostic methods or techniques 
such as soft CBR can be deployed when dealing with fuzzy domains, which will 
enhance the diagnostic system. 
4.4 Knowledge base and fault database 
The knowledge base contains infon-nation on possible faults on a network e. g. 
infon-nation gathered from the network FMEA documents (manufacturers and device 
suppliers), message specification and test data. 
document converter converts different document fon-nats to a common and 
portable format e. g. XML in this implementation. Document conversion 
discussed in 
the previous chapter is illustrated in Fig. 4-15 a) where two types of FMEA 
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documents, CAN message specification and test data are converted into an XML 
format. The information recorded in the knowledge base is represented as 
(previously known) cases since CBR is implemented in this work. A case structure 
comprises a title, case features and a network fault code related to the case. An 
example of a case stored in the knowledge base is illustrated in Fig. 4-15 b) where 
case features and a related network fault code are represented. 
message spec. 
Manufacture's FMEA 
I Suppliers' FMEA I 
-ID 
- Transmitter 
- Cvcle Time 
Document 
Converter 
I 
XML 
Diagnostic 
Knowledge Base 
a) 
Test Data 
- Flags 
-# Error Frame 
<caseOO01> 
<NM>1</NM> 
<NMstatus> 
<nodeStatus>O</nodeStatus> 
</NMstatus> 
<timeout>O</timeout> 
<missingMsg>O</missingMsg> 
<tooManyMsg>l</tooManyMsg> 
<errorFrame>O</errorFrame> 
<diagResp>l</diagResp> 
<networkFaultCode>0001</networkFauItCode> 
</caseOO01> 
b) 
Fig. 4-15. Building the knowledge base: a) building diagram; b) XML data. 
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The represented knowledge is read by a reading algorithm in the diagnostic 
module in a diagnostic process. The algorithm begins with opening the XML file 
and then reads texts in the file line by line into a buffer. The texts in the buffer are 
then copied into local memory spaces of the diagnostic module. Finally, the 
algorithm closes the file. The pseudo code of the algorithm is shown below. 
variables 
char buffer[]; 
char InternalMemories[]; 
on Start 
Initialisationo; 
FileRead ("'CANFMEA. xml"); 
if(file reading is OK) 
I 
while (file reading is OK) 
I 
ReadTextsIntoBufferLineByLineo; 
CopyTextsInTheBufferIntoMemorieso; 
I 
Print("Reading file completed"); 
FileClose("CANFMEA. xml"); 
if (file reading is error) 
I 
Print("File CANFMEA. xml was not opened. "); 
I 
Print("Text in the memories"); 
A separate list of possible root causes indexed by network fault codes is also 
stored in the knowledge base, depicted in Fig. 4-16. One fault can be diagnosed to 
have one root cause or more i. e. a fault may result from firmware, hardware or 
wiring problems. The diagnostic module compares features of a current case 
recorded by the network interface with features of a retrieved case. If the features 
of the retrieved case match those of the current case, the diagnostic module stores a 
diagnostic result in the fault database. 
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<networkfaultCode>0001</networkfaultCode> 
<description>Too many messages sent from ECU</description> 
<possCauses> 
<ecuProblems> 
<firmware> 
<possCause3>Communication speed does not match</possCauses> 
<testMethods>Check the communication speed</testMethods> 
</firmware> 
<hardware> 
<possCauses>Failure in registers and memory locations of the CAN controller</possCauses> 
<testMethods>Access test all registers and memory locations of the controller</testMethods> 
</hardware> 
</ecuProblems> 
</PossCauses> 
</networkfaultCodeOO01> 
Fig. 4-16. Possible root causes represented in the knowledge base. 
The fault database is for storage of network fault codes and details. The 
structure of a memory allocation, illustrated in Fig. 4-17, is designed in a 4-W 
format: What, When, Which's similar, What's different. After finishing a 
diagnostic process, the diagnostic module stores either the results or new case 
found (What). Relevant absolute time and date are also stored (Date/Month/Year, 
Hour/Minute/Second) to help in tracking the sequence of the events (When). 
Additionally, a past case which is similar to the new case and the difference 
between the two cases are provided, as a guide for an expert to test and confirm the 
solution (Which's similar and What's different). 
Although using binary-encoded data formats can save memory footprint, this 
requires a particular tool (or a software script) to interpret the information and does 
not provide standard data portability. This work suggests the use of XML as a 
standard data format throughout the system implementation, including the 
fault 
database. In doing so, there will be convenience of accessing the fault database, 
database maintenance, interoperability and data portability. Hierarchically stored as 
XML cases, fault data can be easily accessed, read and interpreted without 
requiring special service tools. 
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(Case 
a) b) 
Fig. 4-17. Structure of cases in network fault database. 
a) a past case matches the current case 
a new case found 
4.5 An example algorithm of RINDS 
This section gives an example algorithm of RINDS where the software code is 
written in Communication Access Programming Language (CAPL). The 
simulation is conducted by using CANoe, a CAN bus simulation and network 
design tool [119]. The "timeout", "m i ssing-mes sage" and "too-many-message" 
fault detection, and CBR diagnosis using case matching are presented. 
The code begins with a variable declaration where timers, counters, array 
spaces etc. are declared and allocated. 
What 
When 
Which's similar 
Similar case 
Casej 
L Similarity 
value 
What's different 
(Difference) 
Difference 1 
1-(Iifference 
n 
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variables 
I 
msTimer diagNodeMultMstimer; //Timer in ms. 
char timeoutFlag[40961; 
char missingMsgFlag[40961; 
char tooManyMsgFlag[40961; 
//Timeout flag 
//Missing-message flag 
//Too-many-message flag 
int msgRate[40961; //Measured message rates 
int msgRateSpec[4096]; //Message rates from sPecification 
int errorFrameCounter, errorFrameRate; //Counters 
long caseID; //Case ID 
Then the code initialises the variables,, and reads the information of the network 
from the knowledge base. The information involves message details, transmitter 
names and specified message rates. The timer is configured to repeatedly elapse at 
a particular period e. g. 100 ms, and afterwards the timer interrupt routine is 
entered. 
on start 
I 
int i, msgID; 
getMsgDetailso; //Get details such as ID, Tx names 
getMsgRateSpeco; //Get rates from specification 
getRepresentedCaseso; //Get knowledge from knowledge base 
setTimer(diagNodeMultMstimer, 100); //Set timer to 100 ms. 
Concurrently, application messages on the network are counted. CAPL has a 
feature "on message" which automatically interrupts the main function when 
specified messages are received. This feature is used with a counter to count the 
number of each application message. The error frame is also counter in the same 
way by using a CAPL feature "on errorFrame". 
on message //Do this when any message is received 
f 
//count the number of the received message and put into array 
msgRate[this-ID] = msgRate[this. ID] + 1; 
on errorFrame //Do this when an error frame is received 
I 
//count the number of error frames 
errorFrameCounter++; 
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After the timer elapses, the timer interrupt routine is entered where fault detection 
functions are called to detect "timeout", "missing-message" and "too-many- 
message" faults of each application message. It is noted that the number of 
messages of each application message is counted in the aforementioned "on 
message" function. If faults are detected, the faults are recorded as cases and the 
diagnostic function is called. 
on timer diagNodeMultMstimer 
I 
errorFrameRate = errorFrameCounter; 
errorFrameCounter = 0; 
timeoutDetectiono; 
missingMsgDetectiono; 
tooManyMsgDetectiono; 
diagnosisNotificationo; //Diagnostic module is notified 
diagnosiso; //Diagnostic module starts diagnosis 
setTimer(diagNodeMultMstimer, 100); //Restart timer 
In the "diagnosis" function, faults on each application message are diagnosed. The 
function stores each diagnosed case in an XML-formatted file. The stored file can 
be accessed by a whole-vehicle fault management system, where implemented, or 
an off-board diagnostic tool that has an ability to open an XML file. 
void diagnosis(void) 
f 
int i, msgID; 
for(i = O; i < 4096; i++) 
f 
if(msgRateSpec[il != 0) 
1 
msgID 
//4096 message IDs 
//Check all specified messages 
//Diagnosis using exact matching 
exactCaseMatching(msgID); 
storeDiagnosedCaseInXML(msgID); //Store results 
90 
This example was executed in the simulation mode of CANoe 5.2. The 
resource usage was measured as follows. 
* The file size of the CAPL code is 19 kB; 
9 The associated executable file (*. cbf) is 345 kB; 
9 Each diagnosed case requires 400 B. 
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed an implementation of an on-board 
network level diagnostic system based on the proposed framework. Enhanced 
techniques for network level fault detection newly developed in this thesis, namely 
Adaptive OSEK NM and "too-many-message" fault detection, have been 
presented. Existing technologies and methodologies that can be applied to network 
level diagnosis have been discussed. The network level fault detection, case-based 
reasoning diagnosis, and suggested structures of a knowledge base and a fault 
database have been demonstrated through the implementation of RINDS. The 
implementation steps involving three sequential experiments on CAN networks are 
presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Experiments 
Chapter 4 discussed how an on-board network level diagnostic system based on the 
framework proposed in Chapter 3 can be realised. In particular, an implementation 
of RINDS that deploys various existing and new fault detection, isolation and 
diagnostic methods is introduced. This chapter presents the results of experimental 
trials with RINDS aimed at evaluating its feasibility and performance 
characteristics. The trials involved three major sequential experiments on CAN 
networks: 
e Preliminary software-based simulation for proof of concept by using a CAN 
bus simulation tool [ 109,114,115]; 
* Partial system experiment where a simulated system is implemented to 
function with actual hardware by using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) 
facility [171; 
9 Full system experiment where the implemented in-vehicle diagnostic 
system is connected to an actual in-vehicle network on a Lab-Car. 
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5.1 Preliminary software-based simulation 
A preliminary simulation experiment with RINDS using CANoe 5.2 was 
conducted. The objective was to simulate a network level diagnostic system to 
function with the two inputs fed into the network interface module-message rates 
and NM, illustrated in Fig. 5-1. 
5.1.1 Experiment set-up 
The network fault detection and diagnosis was implemented in a gateway ECU to 
which two CAN-HS buses are connected. The simulation set-up is illustrated in 
Fig. 5-2 where there are two CAN-HS buses (Body System and Powertrain), a 
Door-L ECU, a Door-R ECU, a Gateway ECU, an Engine ECU (EMS) and a 
Transmission Control ECU (TCU). Both buses were configured to have NM 
messages circulating in logical rings and the ECUs to periodically transmit their 
application messages in fault-free conditions. The message communication 
functions in the ECUs were simulated by using CAPL scripts. 
To simulate faulty conditions, the functions were manually controlled via a 
graphic user interface (GUI), shown in Fig. 5-3, in order to inject application 
message faults and NM faults defined in Table 4-1 on the buses. 
Message Rates 
frames Network 
Error 
NM interface Notification 
Network DTCs 
Fig. 5-1. The two inputs for preliminary simulation (black: considered in the 
simulation; grey: not considered). 
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Fig. 5-2. Simulated system set-up. 
In this simulation, the fault detection (defined in the network interface module 
of the framework) was implemented, which includes message rate monitoring and 
reading node status from OSEK NM. These two fault detection techniques are 
based on the existing OSEK NM mechanism yet they are improved by an 
additional technique newly developed in this thesis, namely Adaptive OSEK NM 
presented in Chapter 4. 
An additional "too-many-message" (F3) fault detection was implemented in the 
IDNM mode of the Adaptive OSEK NM. The message rate monitoring in the 
network interface module checks whether the current rate of each application 
message (N. ) is within the normal operating band defined by its specified value 
(N, i) and the threshold value (Nti). 
Messages Tx (msg/s) 
10 ý, ýl n 
10 W'Door 
L Door R 
20 - 
TCU' EMS 
Fig. 5-3. User interface for manual fault injection. 
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The measurement of the message rates can be seen in the statistics window of 
CANoe, where the horizontal axis of the statistics window displays hexadecimal 
message IDs and the vertical axis represents the message rates in msg/s. Fig. 5-4 
shows the normal condition of the simulated network, where application messages 
with different message IDs are transmitted within the normal operating bands 
defined by: 
N, j - Nj:! ý N,, i: 5 Nj + Ni 
The Fl,, F2 and F3 on different application messages were injected on both 
buses. An example of the faults on Powertrain is shown in Fig. 5-5: FI on message 
0016, F2 on message OxIF5 and F3 on message Ox7DB. These faults were 
simulated to represent faults from the internal subsystem in the ECUs, e. g. the 
communication controller or the software application. Relevant flags were defined 
to represent the faults Fl, F2 and F3, called "timeout", "missing-message" and 
-4too-many-mes sage" flags respectively. These flags are recorded in current cases to 
inform the diagnostic module of what faults have been detected. 
Lrr6gJ5 
I 10A 
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Ns + Nt IF 
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Fig. 5-4. Normal condition. 
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Fig. 5-5. Simulated CAN message faults. 
The following three different fault detection approaches were implemented in 
the Gateway ECU. 
9 Single DNM: traditional fault detection by using DNM was implemented to 
detect faults on both buses. Application messages were not monitored; 
9 Switched NM on Body System: NM message and application message 
losses were injected to the Body System bus. The fault detection switched 
from DNM to IDNM when NM messages were not available; 
* Combined NM on Powertrain: both NM and application messages were 
monitored at all time on the Powertrain bus. By doing this, more accurate 
detection and diagnostics should be achieved. 
5.1.2 Experimental results 
The detection timings of the different Adaptive OSEK NM approaches are compared 
in a single figure as shown in Fig. 5-6. The horizontal axes are time scales. The vertical 
axis of the top graph represents when the faults are in ected. The lower vertical axes i 
represent fault indicator, e. g. when the faults detected and not detected, with Boolean 
values I and 0 respectively. The comparison shows different performance of the 
different approaches in terms of their coverage, robustness and continuity. 
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Fig. 5-6. Detection timings of the different Adaptive OSEK NM approaches. 
Firstly, the Single DNM was able to detect NM message losses on both buses 
whereas the application message faults (F I, F2 and 173) were not detected, due to 
the fact that Fl, F2 and F3 were not monitored when using the Single DNM 
approach. Secondly, on the Body System bus, after the loss of NM message had 
been detected, the Gateway ECU switched its detection mode to IDNM to monitor 
application messages so that it was able to continue fault detection, i. e. F3 and FI 
on the Body System bus were detected by the Gateway ECU. Finally, every single 
fault injected into Powertrain was detected by the Gateway ECU where the 
Combined NM approach was implemented. 
Fig. 5-7 specifically shows the fault-free and faulty conditions in the time 
domain together with when the fault detection in the network interface module 
detected the injected application message faults on Powertrain. The detection 
timing of the fault detection was recorded by using a timestamp feature. Each 
detection process was measured around I ms by using a time measurement feature 
in CANoe. The detection delay was unable to be measured from the simulation due 
to the time measurement resolution which is limited at 10 ps. 
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Fig. 5-7. Detection timing of the fault detection on Powertrain. 
After detecting a fault, the network interface module stores the fault in an 
XML-formatted case as a current case and notifies the diagnostic module of the 
faults. Fig. 5-8 illustrates the XML schema of the case structure. It consists of the 
following case features: 
a case identification (ID) from 0- 2048; 
9 CAN message ID from 0- 4096; 
0 current rate of the message in msg/s; 
* bus name e. g. Powertrain; 
* transmitter details including the ECU name that transmits the CAN message 
and NM node ID (if the DNM is used on the bus); 
* NM type-DNM (d) or IDNM (i); 
* NM status indicating NM node status if the DNM is used on the bus-0: 
Present; 1: Absent; 2: Limp-home; 
0 "timeout", "missing-message', and "too-many -message" flags representing 
different detected fault types (1: fault detected, 0: no fault detected); 
0 timestamp. 
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<caseO> 
<ID>Ox7DB</ID> 
<rate>98</rate> 
<bus>Powertrain</bus> 
<transmitter> 
<name>Engine</name> 
<NMnodeID>27</NMnodeID> 
</transmitter> 
<NM>i</NM> 
<NMstatus> 
<nodeStatus>O</nodeStatus> 
</NMstatus> 
<timeout>O</timeout> 
<missingMsg>O</missingMsg> 
<tooManyMsg>1</tooManyMsg> 
<time>Wed Jul 19 09: 48: 35 2006</time> 
</caseO> 
Fig. 5-8. XML schema for a current case. 
The current case was diagnosed by the diagnostic module where CBR was 
implemented. In this preliminary simulation, an exact match approach to similarity 
and quantitative case features were used in the diagnostic process [114]. The 
diagnostic module then stores the diagnosed fault and network fault codes relevant to 
the fault into the fault code database, which can be seen in Fig. 5-9. 
It has been demonstrated through this preliminary simulation that the simulated 
on-board network level diagnostics based on the proposed framework can detect, 
diagnose and store the simulated common faults F I, F2, F3 and F4, by using the 
new detection technique and a simple CBR method. The next section focuses on a 
partial system simulation experiment where the simulated diagnostic system is 
connected to a real ECU. 
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<? xml version="I if encoding="ISO-88,19-1" standalone="yes' ?> 
<diag> 
<start>Wed Jul 19 09: 49: 51 2006</start> 
<caseO> 
<]D>Ox7DB, --. /ID> 
<rate>98</rate> 
- <transrnitter> 
<name> Engine </name> 
<NMnodeI1)>27</NMnodeID> 
</transmitter> 
<NM>i</NM> 
- <NMstatus> 
<nodeStatus>O</nodeStatus> 
<MMstatus> 
<timeout>O</timeout> 
<missingMsg>O</missingMsg> 
<tooManyMsg>I</tooManyMsq> 
<time>Wed Jul 19 09: 48: 35 2006</time> 
- <diagnosticResult> 
<match>Case Matched-/match> 
<networkfaultCode>0001 /network fauItCode> 
</diagnostic Pesult 
</caseo> 
<stop>Wed -Jul 19 09: 48: 53 2006</stop> 
</diaq> 
a) 
<? xmi version="1,0" encoding="ISO-88S9-1" standalone="yes" ?> 
<networkFauItCode> 
<netuvorkfauItCodeOOO1> 
<tietworkfakjltCode>oool</networkfaL4]tCode> 
<description>Too many messages are sent from the ECU</description> 
- <POSSCaUses> 
- <ecuProblems> 
- <firmware> 
<possCauses>Communication speed does not mat ch</poss Ca uses> 
<testMethods>Check the communication speed</testMethods> 
</firmware> 
- <hardware> 
<possCauses>Failure in registers and memory locations of the communication controller</possCauses> 
<testMethods>Access test to all registers and memory locations of the communication cont roll er</t e stMethods> 
</hardware> 
</ecuProblems> 
</possCauses> 
</network fauItCodeOOO 1> 
b) 
Fig. 5-9. a) Diagnosed result; b) Fault details and possible cause indexed by 
network fault code. 
5.2 Partial system experiment 
This section presents an experiment with the on-board network level diagnostics 
using a HIL simulation facility. This second set of the trials with RINDS was 
aimed at investigating how the implemented system works with a real ECU 
connected on a real bus with physical disturbances. HIL simulation is a technique 
which allows system developers to partially exercise or test a system or control 
algorithms being developed with a real working environment in an early 
development stage. This reduces dependence on system -under-test prototypes such 
as a real costly vehicle [10 1,120]. 
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An experiment with RINDS using HIL simulation and a real ECU was 
conducted to obtain diagnostic results and to evaluate the efficiency of the system. 
The number of error frames induced by external disturbances was taken into 
account by the network interface module, as shown in Fig. 5-10. The experimental 
hardware included a HIL simulator, a CAN bus disturbance simulator and a real 
ECU embedded in an instrument cluster. Four message communication faults and 
physical hardware faults were injected. 
5.2.1 Experiment set-up 
A partial system-a system where real hardware is connected to virtual hardware 
(simulated ECUs)-was set up. The partial system, illustrated in Fig. 5-11, 
comprised a simulated faulty ECU (FECU), a diagnostic ECU (DECU) where the 
diagnostic system was implemented, an instrument cluster (INST) from an actual 
vehicle in which a real ECU is embedded, a CAN bus disturbance simulator, a 
dSPACE HIL simulator [121], and an offline diagnostic tool (DIAGI). In addition, 
a digital oscilloscope was attached to the set-up to measure physical signals on 
CAN-HS. The annotations El - E35 Wl - W3!, Cl - C3 and MI - M3 are to be 
referred to in the discussion of locating faulty devices using multiple discrete 
events at the end of Section 5.2. 
Message Rates 
Error frames 
NM 
Network DTCs 
-op.. E rro r 
Notification 
Fig. 5-10. Inputs for partial system experiment (black: considered in the 
experiment; grey: not considered). 
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Fig. 5-11. Partial system set-up. 
The FECU transmitted required CAN messages to the INST and simulated 
message communication faults. The disturbance simulator was connected to the 
CAN-HS running at 500 kbps to simulate physical level disturbances, which in turn 
induces error frames to be sent on the bus. RINDS was implemented in the DECU 
by using CAPL. The INST hosted embedded software implemented in an actual 
vehicle. The HIL simulator generated required analogue and digital signals the 
INST would receive in a real vehicle such that the INST can be working properly. 
The INST also received some more CAN messages provided by the simulator by 
using CAN message block set, shown in Fig. 5-12. 
[EngineTemp 
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CAN CONTROLLER 
SETUP 
DS2211CAN_SETUP - 
BI Cl 
Group Id: RTICAN1 
MUL_INFO 
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Terminator13 
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Terminator15 
Fig. 5-12. CAN message block set. 
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The monitoring of functions and variables of the simulator was processed 
through a GUI created by ControlDesk [121], shown in Fig. 5-13. Apart from 
network-relevant parameters labelled with 'N', the GUI also displays simulated 
vehicle parameters such as engine speed, engine temperature, vehicle speed, gear 
position, etc., which are labelled with 'V'. 
The DIAG I is a commercial diagnostic tool designed for reading DTCs logged 
in ECUs' memory after vehicle faults have been detected by the ECUs, as well as 
obtaining vehicle's signals and configuration data at service centres. The DIAG I 
was connected to both CAN-HS and CAN-LS buses via a J1962 connector to 
communicate with the real ECU in the INST. In this experiment, DIAG I was used 
to read DTCs related to communication faults to be compared with diagnostic 
results of RINDS so that diagnostic efficiency of RINDS could then be evaluated. 
5.2.2 Fault scenarios 
The fault scenarios considered in this experiment are twofold: application message 
faults and communication errors indicated by error frames. 
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Application messagefaults 
Application messages used in this experiment are detailed in Table 5-1. The 
listed transmitter names are the ECUs that would transmit these messages in an 
actual vehicle. In this experiment, however, these messages were transmitted by the 
simulated FECU for a fault injection purpose. The application message faults Fl- 
F3 defined in the previous chapter were still simulated. In addition, RINDS takes 
into account the number of error frames resulting from physical disturbances as the 
error frames can instantly indicate the qualitative parameter so called "network 
health". 
Errorftames 
This experiment was to demonstrate that RfNDS takes into account the number 
of error frames for diagnosis. Early warning by monitoring incipient faults (inferred 
from the number of error frames) which could prevent further serious failures is 
demonstrated in the full experiment section. 
Table 5-1. CAN messages used in the experiment. 
Message ID (HEX) Transmitter Cycle (ms. ) 
OxO32 Transmission Control Module (TCM) 20 
OxOA5 Gear Shift Control Module (GSM) 10 
OxOBF Electric Park Brake ECU (EPB) 30 
Ox1 IF Engine Control Module (ECM) 25 
OxI2F Engine Control Module 12 
OxI4F Engine Control Module 8 
OxI8F Engine Control Module 20 
OxIFC Electronic Steering Column ECU 35 
Ox22E Engine Control Module 48 
Ox26F Dynamic Stability Control (DSC) 20 
Ox29F Dynamic Stability Control 10 
Ox2C9 Restraint Control Module (RCM) 20 
Ox3BF Dynamic Stability Control 20 
Ox3CF Dynamic Stability Control 20 
Ox3DF Automatic Front Light System ECU 20 
Ox3EF Adaptive Damping Control Module (ADCM) 30 
Ox4DF Pedestrian Impact ECU (PEE) 20 
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A preliminary investigation into the variation of the number of error frames with 
different disturbances was conducted to investigate the relationship between the 
number of error frames and the network condition. Three disturbances (DI-D3) 
were injected on the CAN-HS by using a disturbance simulator. These disturbances 
were triggered every 500,100,50,10,5 and I ms. The details of these three 
disturbances are as follows: 
9 DI is an '8-Dominant' disturbance containing eight dominant bits 
(00000000); 
* D2 has four dominant and four recessive bits alternately (01010101); 
* D3 is an analogue disturbance on the wiring composed of an R-C parallel 
circuit with a 10-0 resistance (Rd) and aI O-nF capacitor connected across 
the CAN_H and CAN_L,, shown in Fig. 5-14. 
An example of a signal distortion effected by the analogue disturbance is 
illustrated in Fig. 5-15 where the data can still be decoded by the oscilloscope and 
there are no error frames transmitted. Fig. 5-16 depicts a zoomed-in capture of the 
distorted signal. Fig. 5-17 shows a situation where there are more disturbances 
injected such that error frames are transmitted and the data cannot be decoded by 
the oscilloscope. 
CAN_H 
CANJ 
Fig. 5-14. R-C circuit for simulating analogue disturbances. 
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Fig. 5-15. Physical CAN signal disturbed by an analogue disturbance. 
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Fig. 5-16. Zoomed-in CAN signal disturbed by an analogue disturbance. 
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Fig. 5-17. Physical CAN signal distorted by more analogue disturbances. 
Table 5-2 presents preliminary results for Transmission Failure Index (TFI) 
defined as the ratio of error frames to total frames, expressed as a percentage. This 
investigation showed that there is some relationship between the number of error 
frames and different fault conditions repeated at different frequencies, which 
apparently needs to be investigated in more detail in future work. The number of 
error frames will increase nonlinearly as more disturbances are injected. It is only 
when the disturbances are repeated more frequently, e. g. every I ms, that the 
communication stopped. However, this information is not being used in this trial; 
rather, it will be used in the full system experiment. 
Table 5-2. TH tested with different disturbances. 
Repeat (ms. ) 
Disturbances 500 100 50 10 5 
DI 0.25% 1.00% 1.70% 10.00% 16.00% Communication stopped 
D2 0.20% 0.80% 1.60% 7.80% 14.50% Communication stopped 
D3 0.20% 0.80% 0.42% 3.70% 6.30% Communication stopped 
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5.2.3 CBR process 
In the previous simulation, the way the diagnostic module dealt with unknown 
faults was to simply store them as new cases in the fault database. Robustness with 
respect to fault types was ignored. In contrast, in this partial simulation, case 
adaptation was implemented for diagnosis of faults that were not stored in the 
knowledge base. 
Instead of purely using the exact match approach, the diagnostic module 
extracts current case features for a calculation of a similarity between the current 
and the retrieved cases as a percentage. The case with the similarity value greater 
than a threshold e. g. 0.75 (at least three out of four features match) was selected for 
case adaptation. For the similarity value lower than 0.75, the system has to request 
advice, tests for the new case, or case repairs from another diagnostic support 
system such as a central diagnostic service from the manufacturer. These actions 
can be taken off-board or remotely, which is considered as important future work. 
5.2.4 Experimental results 
The disturbances DII D2 and D3 were injected before the application message faults. 
All application messages listed in Table 5-1 were tested with F I, F2 and F3 defined 
in Table 4-1. There were 102 tests conducted in total (6 x 17 messages, see 
Appendix D for surnmarised results of application message faults). 
Fig. 5-18 illustrates a comparison between the detection timings of RINDS and 
the diagnostic system within the INST, where, for illustration purposes, the CAN 
message faults of the messages OxOA5 and Oxl2F are presented and discussed. The 
comparison shows that when DI, D2 and D3 were injected, they were not detected 
by the traditional diagnostic system because it did not take into account the presence 
of error frames as network level faults, provided that the overall message 
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communication is within acceptable limits, e. g. message received within a specified 
time. Similarly, the intermittent faults "too-many-message" and "missing-message" 
were not considered by the traditional diagnostic system as network level faults. The 
system did not detect those injected CAN message faults of the messages OxOA5 and 
Oxl2F. It was only when the INST did not receive the messages from the FECU 
within a specified period of time (the permanent fault "timeout") that the traditional 
diagnostic system detected the fault and logged seven DTCs related to 
communication faults. 
In contrast, RINDS detected every disturbance and every message 
communication fault injected. When DI, D2 and D3 were injected, the number of 
error frames 10,2 and 2 were detected by RINDS respectively. RINDS also 
detected "timeout", "'too-many-message" and "missing-message" of the messages 
OxOA5 and OxI2F, which were injected during the 3 rd and the 8 th second. As 
mentioned earlier, RINDS identifies these types of underlying network problems as 
network level faults; therefore the faults were diagnosed and recorded in XML- 
formatted cases. Similar observations were also made when faults were injected on 
all messages shown in Table 5-1. 
Injected faults 
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Fig. 5-18. Detection timing comparison. 
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0 
When RINDS was temporarily disconnected from the network, it detected lost 
messages from all ECUs. Possible causes of this fault were diagnosed as physical 
connection problems, e. g. loose or disconnected CAN bus connector or wiring of 
the ECU in which RINDS is embedded (the DECU in this experiment), or 
problems in the CAN controller in the ECU. 
Fig. 5-19 illustrates an example of the diagnostic results of RINDS recorded in 
XML-formatted cases. The Casel contains details of "too-many- message" of the 
message OxOA5 which was incorrectly transmitted from the GSM (simulated by the 
FECU). The transmission rate error of 112 messages/s, which is above the 
specified rate, was detected and in turn a "tooManyMsgFIag" was set to 1. The 
diagnostic result and the network fault code (0001) of this fault, diagnosed by the 
diagnostic module, were shown under the timestamp. Likewise, Case2 provides a 
detailed diagnostic result of the "too-many-message" of the message Ox I 2F. 
The network fault code is explained in more detail in an XML-formatted file 
stored in the fault database. As shown in Fig. 5-20, this file provides more self- 
explanatory diagnostic information, such as descriptions of the network fault codes, 
possible root causes in ECU firmware or hardware and test methods. 
<? xml version="I. O" encoding="ISO-8859-1" standalone="yes" ?> 
<diag> <case2> 
<start>Tue ]an 23 11: 30: 16 2007</start> <ID>Oxl2f</ID> 
- <casel> <transmitter>ECM</transmi t ter> 
<ID>Oxga5</ID> <errorFrame>O</errorFrame> 
<transmitter>GSM</transmitter> <rate> 100</rate> 
<errorFrame>O</errorFrame> <tImeoutFIagA</timeoutFlag> 
<rate> 112</rate> <missingMsgFIag>O</missingMsgFiag> 
<timeoutFlag>O</timeoutFlag> <tooManyMsgFIag> 1--/tooManyMsgFIag> 
< missingMs gF lag> 0</missingMsgF lag> <time>Tue ]an 23 11: 32: 40 2007</time> 
<tooManyMsgFIag> 1</tooManyMsgFIag> <diagnostic P es ult> 
<time>Tue ]an 23 11: 31: 37 2007</time> <match, -Case 0001</match> 
- <diagnosticResult> <networkfauItCode>0001</networkfauItCode> 
<match>Case 0001</match> </diagnosticResult> 
< ne tw orkfaultCode > 000 1 </networkfa ultCode> </case2> 
</diagnosticResult> <stop>Tue ]an 23 11: 33: 16 2007</stop 
</casel> </diag> 
Fig. 5-19. Diagnostic result. 
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Oxml version='1,0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" standalone='yes" ?> 
<networkF ault Code> 
<networkfauItCodeOO01> 
<network fauItC ode>000 1 </networkfa uItCode> 
<description>Too many messages are sent from the ECU</description> 
- <possCauses> 
- <ecuProblems> 
- <firmware> 
<possCauses>Communication speed does not match</p oss Causes> 
<testMethods>Check the communication speed</testMethods> 
</firmware> 
- <hardware> 
<possCauses >Failure in registers and memory locations of the communication control ler</p o ss Causes> 
<testMethods>Access test to all registers and memory locations of the communication controller</testMethods> 
</hardware> 
</ecuProblerns> 
</Posscauses> 
</network fauItCodeOOO I> 
Fig. 5-20. Detailed network fault code. 
Table 5-3 summarises the results of the partial system experiment. The table 
shows that, by using the traditional diagnostic system, the underlying 
intermittent network problems were not detected and went un-diagnosed. It is 
only when the INST was unable to communicate with the other ECUs that the 
DTCs relevant to communication problems were locally logged. RINDS, 
however, is developed to detect and diagnose any network level faults including the 
underlying problems. RINDS provides network level fault information in addition 
to local DTCs centred around an individual ECU. 
Table 5-3. Summary of the results of the diagnostic tool and RINDS. 
Disturbance/Fault injected Communication fault RINDS 
DTCs set and logged 
DI repeated every 100 ms. 
D2 repeated every 100 ms. 
D3 repeated every 100 ms. 
CAN-HS disconnected ("timeout") 
"too-man y-me s sage" on OxOA5 
"too-many-message" on Ox I 2F 
46missing-message, ' on OxOA5 
0 Error Frame = 10 detected; 
diagnostic results recorded 
0 Error Frame =2 detected; 
diagnostic results recorded 
0 Error Frame =2 detected; 
diagnostic results recorded 
7 diagnostic results recorded 
0 diagnostic results recorded 
0 diagnostic results recorded 
0 diagnostic results recorded 
64missing-message" on OxI2F 0 diagnostic results recorded 
It is also possible to locate faulty components by using the multiple discrete 
events approach, provided that the fault information from all ECUs is analysed 
altogether. Referring to Fig. 5-11, the fault symptom data shown in Table 5-4 is 
related to a situation in the experiment where a "timeout" fault on M3, which is a 
message transmitted by the INST (M), was detected by the simulated ECUs (El, 
E2), and timeout faults on MI and M2 were detected by the INST (D). After 
considering the components involved in the communication path as shown in Table 
5-51 W4 was identified as a possible faulty component. 
This experiment has demonstrated how RINDS functions with a real ECU 
connected on a real network with physical disturbances. The number of error 
frames is taken into account by the fault detection. For the diagnostics of the faults 
injected in the experiment, the CBR approach explored for diagnosis has shown 
that it can provide accurate diagnostic results. In the next experiment, the number 
of error frames is added in case features to help the diagnostic module narrow 
down potential faulty components. 
Table 5-4. Fault symptom table: M3 not received by all ECUs except E3 itself. 
where Si: Symptom i 
Table 5-5. F ). vaun isoiat ion tame io r tne sy ills III I 
El Wl Cl E2 W2 1C2 I E3 W3 C3 W4 
si I I 1 0 01 01 1 1 1 1 
S2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S3 I I I I I 1 0 0 0 1 
p x 
where Si: SYMPtOm i 
in Table 5-4. 
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5.3 Full system experiment 
In this experiment, all inputs were fed into the network interface module, as shown 
in Fig. 5-21. In addition to the inputs in the previous experiment, responses from 
ECUs to diagnostic request messages and network-re levant DTCs were considered. 
It is, however, unnecessary that DTCs are gathered at every time the network 
interface module detects faults. It is only when the diagnostic module requires 
more fault information in the component and feature levels that the DTC gathering 
is required to operate. 
The number of error frames was added into case features. However, different 
numbers of error frames could be caused by the same fault type. For instance, a 
loose wiring could induce a number of error frames between 15 to 20 frames. It is 
inefficient to store cases representing the same symptom in the knowledge base 
despite different numbers of error frames in the cases. Therefore, instead of using 
exact values of the number of error frames, a pre-diagnostic system (PDS) was 
implemented for classifying the number of error frames into subgroups such that 
the number of cases stored in the knowledge base could be reduced. 
RINDS was tested with an actual in-vehicle network on the Lab-Car. Shown in 
Fig. 5-22, the Lab-Car comprises 24 ECUs connected on different buses such as 
CAN-HS, CAN-LS, LIN and MOST. This experiment is focused on network level 
diagnostics on the CAN-HS. 
Message Rates 
Error frames 
NM 
Network DTCs 
Network 
p, Error interface 
Notification 
Fig. 5-21. Inputs for full system experiment. 
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Fig. 5-22. Lab-Car. 
Fault detection for message rate and NM was the same as that in the 
preliminary simulation. Responses from ECUs to diagnostic request messages and 
network-re levant DTCs gathering were additionally implemented. A method for 
pre-diagnosing incipient underlying network problems, by interpreting the number 
of error frames, was also integrated. This provides the main diagnostic system in 
the diagnostic module with additional network level information. The first piece of 
the information is a classification of the network fault causes whether: 
* they are likely to be faulty electrical wiring or connectors (called 
"peripheral" throughout this thesis) or; 
* they are likely to be faults in ECUs, which include communication 
controllers and application software (called "internal" throughout this 
esis). 
Another piece of the information is called "network health", which indicates 
healthiness of the network when being used for message communication. This 
information is useful for the main diagnostic module to diagnose whole network 
faults or to perforrn further network prognostics. An ANFIS was applied to network 
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pre-diagnosis, by utilising available network protocol signals, e. g. error frames on 
CAN-HS. These conditions of ECUs and the network were recorded in case features. 
5.3.1 ANFIS for network level fault diagnosis 
Fig. 5-23 illustrates the PDS integrated in the network interface module. The PDS 
infers from a number of error frames and the calculated bus resistance of a network 
that the network is healthy, fair or unhealthy, and that the possible cause of the 
error frames is "peripheral" or "intemal". 
Experiment set-up 
The training data consisting of a number of error frames induced by different 
types of disturbances was collected from the CAN-HS on the Lab-Car. A 
disturbance simulator was connected to the CAN-HS, as shown in Fig. 5-24, to 
disturb message communication such that error frames were transmitted, 
representing underlying network conditions (or so-called network health). 
The injected disturbances were divided into two major groups: analogue and 
digital disturbances, as shown in Table 5-6, which were for simulation of 
"peripheral" and "internal" faults respectively. For DI-D 10, each disturbance was 
injected 10 times per cycle for 600 cycles with a 100 ms pause time. DI I was 
manually and randomly injected. Fig. 5-25 illustrates an example of the injected 
disturbances, D7. 
Message Rates 
Error frames 
NM 
Network DTCs 
Network interface 
PDS 
Bus resistance 
CBR Whole network diagnostic output 
Fig. 5-23. PDS fitted in the network interface module. 
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Network 
interface 
PDS ECU II ECU I 
CAN-HS 
Disturbance 
simulator ECU II ECU I 
Fig. 5-24. Experiment set-up. 
The analogue disturbances were simulated by varying the impedance of an R-C 
parallel circuit connected across CAN_H and CAN_L, as previously illustrated in 
Fig. 5-14. In doing this, the electrical signals between the two wires were distorted 
and thus error frames were transmitted. The digital disturbances were for 
simulation of "internal" faults. Some recessive bits in CAN messages being sent on 
the bus were corrupted by simulated dominant bits during message communication 
and thus error frames were transmitted. 
Table 5-6. Disturbances used in this experiment. 
Disturbance Disturbance Type Disturbance Disturbance Pause time 
per cycle cycles (Ms. ) 
DI Analogue: Rd = 10 Q; C 10 nF. 10 600 100 
D2 Analogue: Rd = 7.5 Q; C 10 nF. 10 600 100 
D3 Analogue: Rd = 5 92; C= 10 nF. 10 600 100 
D4 Analogue: Rd = 15 Q; C= 10 nF. 10 600 100 
D5 Analogue: Rd = 17.5 92; C = 10 nF. 10 600 100 
D6 Digital: 00 10 600 100 
D7 Digital: 01 10 600 100 
D8 Digital: 0000 1111 10 600 100 
D9 Digital: 0101 10 600 100 
DIO Digital: OuOu 10 600 100 
DII Digital: 01 1 Manual N/A 
Note: 0= dominant bit; I= recessive bit; u= undisturbed. 
116 
Fig. 5-25. Disturbance D7. 
The training data represented a number of error frames on the CAN-HS whilst 
CAN messages were still transmitted as normal; however, the network was 
obviously unhealthy due to the error frames caused by the injected disturbances. It 
can be seen in Fig. 5-26 that while communication was still possible, the average 
number of error frames caused by analogue disturbances (blue plots) varied from 0 
to 15 frames/s. whereas those caused by digital disturbances (red plots) varied from 
0 to 80 frames/s. 
It was found that, in this set-up, the communication stopped when an average of 
error frames was over 80 frames/s. It should be noted that some specific types of 
analogue disturbances can stop communication, i. e. if CAN bus impedance is less 
than 5 ohms. However, only a situation where communication is possible despite 
presence of error frames was considered in the experiment. 
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Fig. 5-26. The number of error frames induced by different disturbances: blue plots 
represent error frames induced by the different analogue disturbances; red plots 
represent error frames induced by the different digital disturbances. 
Pre-Diagnostic System (PDS) 
The PDS has two inputs and two outputs as shown in Fig. 5-27. Error frames 
were directly received through the first input of the PDS. Although the bus 
resistance cannot be physically measured, it is approximately calculated by using 
the equation 2-1 and the injected resistance of the disturbance simulator (Rd). 
Further details of the calculation of the bus resistance can be found in Appendix C. 
The two outputs consist of a "possible cause" output ("peripheral", and 
"internal"), and a "network health" output ("healthy", "fair", "unhealthy"). The 
degree of the "possible cause" output is defined as: 
"peripheral" if 0:! ý possible cause output:! ý 0.5 
"intemal" if 0.5 < possible cause output:! ý 
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Error frames P. Possible cause 
PIDS 
Bus resistance -Ao-- Network health 
Fig. 5-27. PDS with 2 inputs: error frame and bus resistance inputs. 
The degree of the network health output is defined as: 
"healthy" if 0:! ý network health output:! ý 0.25 
"fair" if 0.25 < network health output:! ý 0.75 
ccunhealthy" if 0.75 < network health output <I 
It is well known that only single output FIS can be constructed by using 
ANFIS. CANFIS is used instead when multiple outputs are required in 
implementing a diagnostic system. Despite that, the use of two separate ANFIS 
systems to construct the PDS discussed in this experiment was possible since the 
outputs of the PDS were independent. 
Constructing FIS 
The PDS system was divided into two subsystems: possible cause and network 
health subsystems. Each one was trained separately with the relevant training data 
set which was collected from the CAN-HS,, by injecting disturbances varying over 
a range that can cause no error frames at all and stop communication. Each 
subsystem was trained by using 50,100,200 and 400 epochs. 
Plots of RMS errors (RMSE) against number of MFs of the possible cause and 
the network health subsystems are illustrated in Fig. 5-28 and Fig. 5-29 
respectively. The subsystems that were trained with greater numbers of epochs 
provide smaller RMSE values. 
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It can be seen in the Fig. 5-28 that, in the possible cause subsystem, the RMS 
errors at 6 MFs are relatively low and tend to be stable as the number of MFs 
increases. Similarly, in the network health subsystem in Fig. 5-29, the RMS error 
of the training with 400 epochs is very small when the number of MFs is greater 
than 9. For the other trained network health subsystems (50,100 and 200 epochs), 
the RMS errors become very small at around 6 or 7 MFs. Fig. 5-30 depicts the MFs 
of the two subsystems generated by using ANFIS with 15 MFs and 400 epochs. 
If this approach is to be applied in practice, the implementation will be on an 
embedded system platform where simplified yet efficient algorithms are preferred. 
Therefore, this experiment also investigated the performance of lower numbers Of 
MFs applied to the PDS. 
The separate PDS subsystems were simplified and combined to generate a 
single PDS by merging similar MFs into 6 MFs and 3 MFs, shown in Fig. 5-31. 
The simplified 3-MF PDS is illustrated in Fig. 5-31 b) where only 3 MFs are used 
for representing "low", "medium" and "high". 
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Fig. 5-30. a) MFs of the possible cause subsystem; b) MFs of the network health 
subsystem. 
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Fig. 5-3 1. a) Simplified PDS using 6 MFs; b) Simplified PDS using 3 MFs. 
5.3.2 Experimental results 
The constructed PDS was tested with two scenarios: PDS without and with the bus 
resistance input. The objective was to demonstrate the different performance of the 
PDS. 
PDS without the bus resistance input 
The PDS was tested with two testing data sets consisting of the actual number 
of error frames on the Lab-Car. The first data set represents a fault-free condition in 
which no error frames are present on the network (the number of error frames = 0). 
The second data set consists of different number of error frames which represent 
different network condition, illustrated in Fig. 5-32, where FI and F3 are analogue 
disturbances,, and F2 and F4 are digital disturbances. These error frames were 
induced by different types of analogue and digital disturbances which were 
alternately injected every 60 s for 240 s. 
Fig. 5-33 illustrates the results of the PDS when tested with the first testing data 
set (fault-free). The outputs from the PDS have offset values very close to zero 
(lower than IX 10-5 - 
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Fig. 5-32. Testing data representing the faulty condition. 
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The performance of the PDS is evaluated by using the true isolation rate (rj) 
[122]. Fig. 5-34 shows possible causes pre-diagnosed by the PDS where a different 
number of MFs were used. The 15-MF ANFIS has an overall performance about 
90%. The other simplified 6-MF and 3-MF systems can classify possible causes 
with 88.75% and 85% overall performance respectively. Details of the diagnostic 
performance are summarised in Table 5-7. 
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Fig. 5-33. PDS under fault-free condition: a) possible cause; b) network health. 
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Fig. 5-34. Possible cause. 
The network health diagnosed by the PDS is shown in Fig. 5-35. The diagnosed 
results of the PDS with ANFIS 15 MFs and simplified 6 MFs are almost identical. 
The network health is clearly classified across the three regions defined previously, 
namely "unhealthy", "fair" and "healthy". The results of the PDS using 3 MFs also 
spread across the regions with lower confidence of diagnosis. No incorrect 
diagnoses have been found (r, = 100%). 
According to the results in Table 5-7, every PDS performs very well when 
dealing with a high number of error frames caused by the digital faults. On the 
other hand, it is rather difficult (or with a lower degree of confidence) for the 
simplified 3-MF PDS to diagnose causes of failure in a situation where either 
Table 5-7. Possible cause diagnostic performance (ri in 
MFs 
Faults 15 MFs 6 MFs 3 N4Fs 
F1 88.33 88.33 96.66 
F2 90 83.33 50 
F3 83.33 83.33 95 
F4 100 100 100 
Overall 90 88.75 85 
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analogue or digital disturbances can cause similar number of error frames e. g. 0- 15 
frames/s. Nonetheless, precise whole network diagnostics could be achieved if the 
main diagnostic module can recognise contrast between the results of the PDS and 
the other inputs such as network-re levant DTCs. In addition, if the bus resistance 
value is known or can be calculated, then the fault causes in the situation where 
either analogue or digital disturbances can cause similar number of error frames 
can be distinguished from the bus resistance value. 
PDS with the bus resistance input 
The simplified 3-MF and 6-MF PDSs are chosen to demonstrate this test. The 
inference rules are based on the fact that if the error frames are in the range of 0- 
15 frames/s. and the bus resistance is low, then the cause is more likely to be and 
analogue disturbance ("peripheral"). A surface views of the constructed 2-input 
PDS are shown in Fig. 5-36 where the nominal "high" bus resistance is 60 ohm. 
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Fig. 5-37 shows the result of possible cause pre-diagnosis where the rj of the 3- 
MF PDS is improved up to 95% and 100% r, j of the 6-MF PDS can be achieved. 
It has been demonstrated that the PDS without the bus resistance input is able 
to diagnose the possible causes of in-vehicle network problems to some extent, and 
to efficiently classify underlying network error conditions into network health 
categories. With the bus resistance input added, the performance of the PDS is 
significantly improved, especially that of the 6-MF PDS. 
5.3.3 Network-relevant DTC gathering 
A diagnostic service application in the network interface module (tester) was 
implemented to obtain network-re levant DTCs logged in the ECUs after faults have 
been detected. The DTCs were then passed to the diagnostic module. These DTCs 
provided additional fault information in the component and feature levels. 
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Fig. 5-37. Possible cause when calculated bus resistance input is used. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, diagnostic services in this experiment were based on 
the ISO 14229 standard. Two diagnostic services were mainly used to read and clear 
DTCs via both CAN buses, e. g. service OxI9 for reading DTC information and 
service OxI4 for clearing DTC information. The flow control for reading DTCs is 
shown in Fig. 5-38 where the tester sends a reading DTC information service to 
obtain all available DTCs and their snapshot data stored in an ECU. The snapshot 
data is specific data associated with a DTC, which contains operating conditions of 
the vehicle when the DTC is logged such as timestamps, battery voltage etc. Binary- 
formatted DTCs practically stored in ECUs are converted into a text-based format 
and recorded as case features in a current case by the network interface module. 
The current case shown in Fig. 5-39 has two additional features: 
* ccpds": results from the PDS 
o "possible cause": a possible cause inferred from the number error 
frarnes-" internal" (i) and "peripheral" (p); 
o "network health": providing the qualitative healthiness condition of 
the network-"healthy" (h), "fair" (f), and "unhealthy" (u); 
* "DTCs": a list of network-relevant DTCs requested by the diagnostic 
module. 
The DTCs are useful for the diagnostic module to identify the component(s) or 
feature(s) that may have caused the faults. Similar to the previous experiments, the 
diagnostic module used CBR in diagnosing possible root cause(s) of the current 
case. According to the current case in Fig. 5-39, the network health was in "fair" 
condition, which means that there were a few error frames on the network. This 
presence of the error frames was an intermittent fault and traditionally ignored. 
The diagnostic module can infer from the information that the cause(s) of the fault 
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Fig. 5-38. Reading DTCs flow control. 
is unlikely to be on peripheral components since there were no component level 
DTCs logged in the INST. There was only the DTC U0401 which indicates that 
invalid data was received. If there had been faults on the CAN buses, network- 
relevant DTCs such as "UO003: High speed CAN bus (+) open" would have been 
set by the component level diagnostic application in the INST. 
<caseO> 
<ID>Ox4BF</ID> 
<rate>7S</rate> 
<bus>Powertrain</bus> 
<transmitter> 
<name>INST</name> 
<NMnodeID>I</NMnodeID> 
</transmitter> 
<NM>! <1NM> 
<NMstatus> 
<nodeStatus>O</nodeStatus> 
</NMstatus> 
<t! meout>O</timeout> 
<missingMsg>l</missingMsg> 
<tooManyMsg>O</tooManyMsg> 
<pds> 
<possibleCause>i</possibleCause> 
<networkHealth>f</networkHealth> 
</pds> 
<diagResp>l</diagResp> 
<DTCs>U0401</DTCs> 
. <time>Wed Jul 23 10: 08: 35 2006</time> 
</caseO> 
Fig. 5-39. A current case with a network-re levant DTC recorded. 
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5.3.4 Full system performance test 
A full system performance test was carried out based on some assumptions as a 
result of limited availability of the test environment. The "timeout" and "missing- 
message" faults on application messages, and NM faults were generated by the 
interference of analogue and digital disturbances. However,, these faults caused by 
internal faults in the ECU that transmits the messages were unable to be simulated 
because there was no access to the embedded software hosted in the ECU. Only 
"timeout" and "missing-message" faults caused by internal faults in any of the 
other ECUs on the network, e. g. untimely message transmission that corrupts the 
legitimate message being transmitted, were simulated by the injection of the digital 
disturbance. The "too-many-message" faults were injected by using a simulated 
ECU to transmit extra messages on the network. However, the test was based on an 
assumption that any of the other real ECUs would not interfere, i. e. they were 
assumed to be fault-free and thus would not transmit extra messages which could 
be regarded as "too-many-message" faults. 
Given that there are some limitation and assumptions, the performance test can 
still provide useful results in terms of demonstrating the response of RINDS when 
functioning with an actual electronic system which is close to that in a real vehicle. 
More test scenarios are suggested to be conducted in future work provided that 
access to embedded software is available. 
Fig. 5-40 illustrates an example of full system test results of the message OxOA5 
which has a specified message rate of 100 msg/s. Starting from the top of the Fig. 
5-40, the first subplot shows the message rate of the message OxOA5 during the test 
where different message faults resulted from the injected disturbances. In this test, 
the message rate zero represents the "timeout" fault. 
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The "missing-message" fault is the situation where the message rate falls below 
a threshold value, e. g. 50 msg/s. The "too-many-message" fault is when the 
message rate is beyond an upper limit such as 120 msg/s. The second subplot is the 
number of error frames induced by the different disturbances injected during the 
test. The third subplot shows fault detection messages generated by the network 
interface module to represent what fault types are detected. Details of the fault 
detection messages are surnmarised in Table 5-8. The forth subplot illustrates the 
value of the "possible cause" output of the 6-MF 2-input PDS used in the test. 
Calculated bus resistance is shown in the fifth subplot. Fault diagnosis messages 
generated by the diagnostic module are illustrated in the bottom subplot and the 
details of the messages are described in Table 5-9. 
As shown in the fault detection message subplot, every single fault is detected 
even if it is a transient fault such as the faults labelled with 'A'. It can be seen that 
the detection is sensitive to the transition of the message rate. For instance, either 
when a message rate is decreasing or when error frames are detected before the 
message rate falls to zero ("timeout"), the detection system considers this change as 
a "missing-message" fault or an "error frames detected" fault, such as the situations 
labelled with '13'. This also happens in the opposite order, viz, when the message 
rate is going up from zero but has not yet reached the specified rate, as labelled 
with 'C'. Nonetheless, rf, and r,, f are within the desired specification (2.64% and 
0% respectively) 
Table 5-8. Fault detection messaizes. 
Fault detection messages Descriptions 
0 Fault free 
I "timeout" detected 
2 "missing-message" detected 
3 "too-many-message" detected 
4 No message faults detected but error frames detected 
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Table 5-9. Fault diaýznosis messaizes. 
Fault diagnosis messages Descriptions 
0 Fault free 
I Internal faults in the transmitting ECU 
2 Peripheral faults 
3 Internal faul! s_jq an .y of 
the other ECUs 
The plot shows that the fault detection messages can provide information on the 
sequence of the faults at a high sensitivity level. However, a design trade-off 
between the high detection sensitivity and false alarm rates resulted from the 
system suffering from noise is important. Different levels of detection sensitivity 
could be used for detection of faults on different messages. For instance, a sensitive 
detection algorithm may be applied to detecting faults on safety-critical messages 
on CAN-HS whilst a less sensitive algorithm is deployed on CAN-LS. 
The fault diagnosis messages illustrated in the bottom plot were generated from 
the diagnostic module where the fault information from the network interface 
module and the PDS was used in the diagnostic process. An analogue disturbance 
(low bus resistance) that causes error frames to be transmitted at 15 frame/s was 
injected for 60 s starting from the I 000th second. The plot illustrates that fault 
diagnosis messages '2' and '3' were generated when the "possible cause" output of 
the PDS was lower than 0.5 and greater than 0.5 respectively. It is found that at the 
points where the calculated bus resistances are considered to be high, the generated 
diagnosis messages '2' are regarded as wrong diagnoses which are labelled with 
'D'. Apart from those points, the diagnoses are correct. Obviously, the diagnostic 
module diagnoses every single fault detected by the network interface module. As a 
result, there is the same issue about the design trade-off between the sensitivity and 
the false alarm rates discussed above. 
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In summary, this chapter has demonstrated the implementation steps of RINDS, 
involving three major sequential experiments on CAN networks. The first 
experiment was the preliminary software-based simulation for proof of concept, 
where the new fault detection techniques were demonstrated. Second, the partial 
system experiment using a HIL facility showed improved fault detection and 
diagnosis outcomes when compared with those of the conventional diagnostic 
system. Finally, the full system experiment where the implemented diagnostic 
system was connected to the actual in-vehicle electronic systems and networks on 
the Lab-Car was Presented. The full system experiment demonstrated how RINDS 
can infer the possible fault causes and the network health from available signals on 
the networks. The number of error frames is grouped into 6 interrelated subgroups 
e. g. 2 "possible cause" and 3 "network health" subgroups. Clearly, this helps 
reduce a number of required cases in the knowledge base. Additionally, the 
experiment discussed a DTC gathering technique which was used by the diagnostic 
module to obtain network relevant DTCs to be used in the diagnostic process. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
This chapter discusses the experimental results and other various issues arising 
from the implementation trials with RINDS, which include current limitations 
found in the work, resource requirements, how the proposed framework can 
contribute to automated testing in vehicle manufacturing, potential redundant 
channel configurations for transferring diagnostic information and network 
prognostics for a self-healing vehicle. 
6.1 Experimental results 
It has been demonstrated in the preliminary simulation that the simulated on-board 
network level diagnostics based on the proposed framework can detect, diagnose 
and store the simulated common application message faults F I, F2, F3 and F4. The 
whole process from detecting a fault until completing storing fault details into a file 
takes 3 ms on average, which was measured by calculating a relative time 
difference between the beginning and the end of the process, via time management 
functions in the simulation tool. This timing can be different when the system is 
implemented on different platforms. It can be anticipated that the whole process 
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should be relatively quicker when implemented on an embedded system Platform 
since the result file can be stored in a binary format. 
The main contribution presented in the preliminary simulation is the new 
technique for network level fault detection, so-called Adaptive OSEK NM. Despite 
some limitations presented later in this chapter, this new technique based on the 
existing NM standards can enhance the accuracy, robustness and continuity of 
network level fault detection. 
The partial system experiment has demonstrated how RINDS functions with a 
real ECU connected on a real network with physical disturbances. Improved fault 
coverage has been demonstrated by the detection timing comparison and the 
diagnostic result data logged in the fault database. The CBR approach explored for 
use in the diagnostic module of RINDS can provide accurate diagnostic results 
when dealing with the faults injected in the experiment, which included CAN 
message faults and faults induced by physical disturbances. In addition, it has been 
shown that the multiple discrete events approach can be applied to finding faulty 
components on the network if there is a redundant channel available. 
The full system experiment has shown how different approaches can be applied 
in the proposed framework for diagnosing network level faults. A utilisation of 
available protocol signals, e. g. error frames, for network level diagnosis was 
demonstrated. With a single error frame input, the PDS can diagnose the possible 
causes of the injected network level faults to some extent, and efficiently classify 
underlying network error conditions into network health categories, which are very 
useful for further network fault diagnosis or prognosis. Every PDS performed very 
well when dealing with a high number of error frames caused 
by the digital 
disturbances though it was rather difficult (or with a lower degree of confidence) 
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for the simplified 3-MF PDS to diagnose causes of failures in some situations 
where the input data was ambiguous. However, by utilising the calculated bus 
resistance, the performance of the 6-MF and 3-MF PDSs can be improved. 
Another contribution presented in the full system experiment is that the 
proposed framework provides an important link between the networkq the 
component and the feature levels (see Fig. 2-23). Local fault information in the 
form of DTCs can be gathered and analysed by a dedicated whole-vehicle 
diagnostic system. This is vital for the fully on-board fault management system 
since the currently separate diagnostic levels are systematically connected. Table 
6-1 summarises enhanced diagnostic outcomes the proposed framework has 
delivered. 
6.2 Limitations 
This work has three obvious limitations which will be addressed in future work. 
The first limitation results from the assumption made in the trials. The second one 
is related to limited detection of some specific fault types. The last limitation is 
concerned with a requirement for a different network topology. 
Table 6-1. Summary of enhanced diagnostic outcomes of the proposed framework. 
Capability Conventional Proposed framework 
Fault detection Faults monitored locally 
Logged data DTCs with snap shot data 
Fault diagnostics Off-board 
Proprietary tools Required 
Efficiency Time consuming when dealing 
with intermittent faults and 
complicated systems 
Prognostics N/A 
Whole network monitored 
Codes and relevant details 
On-board, real-time 
Not required 
Intermittent and incipient faults 
monitored and diagnosed on- 
board. 
Possible 
Scalability New DTCs/rules added to ECUs New knowledge added off-board 
and diagnostic tools updated or remotely to vehicles 
Transferable data, N/A Possible, by using the XMIL 
transparency schema 
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Firstly, it is assumed in this work that no internal faults occur in the diagnostic 
module which resides in a master node such as the DECU in the partial system 
experiment. This assumption can only be made when testing the functionality of 
the diagnostic system. In practice, there should be a back-up system in another 
ECU which can perform identical diagnostic functions in case the master node fails 
to operate. 
Secondly, the network interface module is currently unable to detect faults on 
sporadic messages since the fault detection algorithm was implemented to monitor 
faults on periodic messages only. Sporadic messages are particularly transmitted 
when relevant events are activated, such as some acknowledge or handshaking 
messages between ECUs. To detect faults on these sporadic messages, a slightly 
more complex algorithm which can cope with the irregularity of the message 
transmission is required. 
However, this is not a limitation of the proposed framework since the additional 
detection algorithm can be included in the network interface module of the 
diagnostic system. The algorithm has to be only activated to monitor the sporadic 
messages when they are transmitted on the network. In addition, the algorithm has 
to know the sequence and timing of the messages it is monitoring. For instance, 
after a message A is present on the network, a message B which is expected to be 
transmitted is monitored by the algorithm. The information on when the message B 
is transmitted has to be added in the knowledge base. Although the conventional 
diagnostic system generally detects "timeout" faults on sporadic messages, the 
additional algorithm can provide "too-many-mes sage" fault detection. Upon the 
implementation of the additional fault detection algorithm, the reasoning system in 
the diagnostic module also needs to be modified accordingly. 
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Finally, on-board fault isolation using multiple discrete events is not possible in 
the system where there is no redundant communication channel when the main 
channel is unavailable. In this case, local diagnostic information in distributed 
ECUs cannot to be transferred to the ECU in which the network level diagnostic 
system is implemented. Nonetheless, if the availability of a redundant channel is 
absolutely impossible or an available redundant channel is also disrupted, the local 
diagnostic information can still be useful for off-board analysis. Further discussion 
on the redundant channel is presented in Section 6.5. 
6.3 Resource issues of RINDS 
Increased requirement of processing memory for RINDS might be a concern 
especially in the cost-sensitive automotive domain. According to the experiments, 
more memory was mainly required for the case storage due to more diagnostic 
result details being stored, and the temporary storage of variables in the Adaptive 
OSEK NM process. 
6.3.1 Case storage 
The required memory space linearly increases as the number of recorded cases 
increases, illustrated in Fig. 6-1. For instance, in the full system experiment, each 
diagnosed case requires 0.4 kB space; therefore the memory requirement can be 
calculated as 0.4n kB, where n is the number of recorded cases. However, if 
necessary, this memory could be reused after an on-board whole-vehicle fault 
management system has taken appropriate interventions, and the recorded cases are 
no longer used. 
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---------- 
XML fiile: s=ize(kB) ------------- 
1 
----------- I -------- I ---- ----- 
4567 10 11 
Number of cases 
Fig. 6-1. Memory requirement for case storage in XML format. 
6.3.2 Resource issues of Adaptive OSEK NM. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Adaptive OSEK NM can provide 
improved robustness, fault coverage and detection continuity when compared with 
single DNM or IDNM. Diagnostic applications can also benefit from the additional 
features "mi ss ing-mes sage" and "too-many-message" fault detection. However, it 
is currently inevitable that more memory resource is required for the combined NM 
approach. 
The relative resource usage of the three approaches-Single DNM, Switched 
NM and Combined NNI-demonstrated in the simulation in the previous chapter is 
illustrated in Fig. 6-2. Obviously, combined NM requires more memory for 
variables (about 50% more than the other approaches require). It is found that the 
increase in resource consumption is currently an inherent drawback of the 
combined NM when being employed in a system where resource consumption is of 
concern. This is because memory allocation to store network status variables is 
fixed. 
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Fig. 6-2. Resource usage of FD using DNM and Adaptive OSEK NM. 
Improvement on this could be achieved by dynamically re-using memory 
space, which will be investigated in future work. Nonetheless,, considering the 
improved fault coverage and continuity of fault detection, Combined NM may be 
more suited for implementation on a powertrain network where its reliability is of 
utmost importance. 
In terms of the additional cost, this should not be of concern for a practical 
implementation as microchips have been becoming cheaper yet more powerful. 
Expense spent for faster microcontrollers and higher memory can be financially 
worthwhile, considering expected reduction in warranty costs, and improvement of 
customer satisfaction. 
6.4 The proposed framework deployed in automated vehicle 
testing 
Testing for in-vehicle electrical and electronic systems is a vital process in vehicle 
manufacturing. Despite availability of various test methods [100 - 108], it is still 
impossible to use an ideal test scheme that provides complete input test coverage to 
perform "exhaustive testing". 
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In order to maximize test coverage, automated testing needs to be considered, 
where a test routine is configured and the system is tested for long periods of time 
with minimal supervision. Test results can be retrieved and analysed either at the end 
or at interim intervals. If the test results are captured, analysed and processed during 
the testing, or at least in parallel to the testing, then coverage can be ftirther increased. 
Schemes for automatic monitoring of system behaviour during test can include: 
* Monitoring visual and audio behaviour through vision and audio systems 
* Monitoring DTC setting within ECUs before and after fault injection 
Monitoring network traffic behaviour before, during and after fault 
injection, with interpretation of the proposed framework can be 
implemented. 
Each one provides a method for monitoring fault behaviour; however none is 
completely satisfactory in its own right. Vision and audio systems are good 
substitutes for the primary human senses. However, the initial set-up time and 
subsequent processing requirements for a system monitoring large areas such as the 
vehicle dashboard can make this type of approach unwieldy. DTC monitoring is a 
good mechanism to observe the fault status of individual ECUs. Monitoring of 
whole system events is not fully possible as DTCs are localised in a specific ECU 
and its associated sub-systems. Furthermore, the automated test needs to be 
interrupted in order for the stored DTC data to be extracted from the ECUs. The 
benefits are realizable only if the assumption that the DTC setting strategies for any 
given ECU is well defined and well executed is true, which is not always the case. 
The proposed framework will contribute to the automated testing of vehicles in 
that it will provide a network monitoring scheme which can monitor whole-system 
behaviour. Network monitoring at a fairly high level in terms of expected traffic 
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against a known good traffic can very quickly point to ECUs or parts of the system 
where erroneous behaviour might be occurring. The advantage here is that the 
initial analysis is in real-time, with a real-time observer sitting on the network, 
providing quick analysis due to its high-level approach. When anomalous 
behaviour is suspected, further detailed analysis can be made. 
For a more comprehensive monitoring of fault functionality, it is possible to use 
all three approaches during automated testing supplemented with initial, interim 
and final human observations as illustrated in Fig. 6-3. Test data stored in a fault 
database can later be used in building a knowledge base. This compatibility will 
ease utilisation of data throughout the whole vehicle manufacturing and 
maintenance processes. 
In addition,, the direct DTC gathering approach in the general framework for 
DTC gathering discussed in Chapter 4 can be deployed in the scheme for monitoring 
DTC setting strategies in ECUs before and after fault injection. A dedicated DTC 
analysis application can be embedded in the network interface module. The DTC 
analysis application is responsible for checking for new or disappeared DTCs from 
pre- and post-test DTC records after the system has undergone a test process. The 
application stores the new or disappeared DTCs for further analysis, if required, in 
either an XML file for processing later or processed and stored as other text 
formats using the XML structure during the test. 
Human observation 
Clear DTCs 
Fault injection 
Vision & audio systems 
Human observation 
DTC monitodng 
CAN bus monitoring and analysis 
Test duration 
-p 
t 
Fig. 6-3. Comprehensive monitoring of fault functionality. 
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Fig. 6-4 illustrates a configuration of a low voltage test suite, developed at 
IARC, for automated testing of in-vehicle electronic systems under low battery 
voltage conditions, where a CAN bus monitoring system and a DTC analysis 
application are deployed. The low voltage test suite comprises a selection of 
configurable simulated battery voltage profiles such as engine crank voltage 
profiles used to test in-vehicle electronic systems. Selected low voltage profiles are 
injected to the system under test by the fault injection unit (FIU). The design 
validation plan defines the expected operation of the system under test. The 
periodic interrogation of the ECU(s) to extract fault codes is carried out using the 
CAN bus interface. 
The test suite runs a number of test sequences each of which is illustrated in 
Fig. 6-5. The test sequence starts with the DTC service clearing current DTCs 
logged in ECUs to prepare a pre-test condition. The DTC service then reads DTCs 
from the ECUs as pre-test DTCs. Next, the FIU is enabled to inject faults into the 
system for a pre-defined period. The DTC service again reads DTCs as post-test 
DTCs and passes them to the DTC analysis application to analyse and store test 
results. 
DTC analysis 
Analysis Applications 
I DTC service monitoring] 
Bus Interface 
ECU ECU 
Co 0 Z> 
1 
CL 
Co 
ECU Z -i 
ý 
< 
ý 
ECU 
System Under Test 
L--Lý2 
---L-t - kF IU e V/, ft, g, 
-ý 
Low Voltage 
P, Ofile Test Suite 
Fig. 6-4. Low voltage test suite. 
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Inject Fault FIU I 
Test duration 
Fig. 6-5. A test sequence. 
Fig. 6-6 illustrates lists of pre-test DTCs, post-test DTCs and a comparison 
result of the first test (called 'Test F) on a real vehicle. The actual record can 
contain many more XML-formatted DTCs; however, only a couple of DTCs are 
shown in a text format for illustration. The DTC analysis application searches and 
compares the pre-test DTCs with the post-test DTCs to find out which DTCs have 
been set subsequent to fault injection ("new" or <N> in the list) or which already 
set DTCs have been cleared after fault injection ("disappeared" or <D> in the list). 
Pre-test 1 
ECU: ECUl 
DTC: BlA02-13-00 
Vsnapshot: 13.25 
Tsnapshot: 03: 53: 35.6 
ECU: ECU2 
DTC: BlGA2-00-00 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
ECU: ECUl 
Post-test 1 
DTC: BlA02-13-00 
Vsnapshot: 13.25 
Tsnapshot: 03: 53: 35 
DTC: BlAOl-13-00 
Vsnapshot: 13.25 
Tsnapshot: 03: 53: 40 
ECU: ECU2 
DTC: U201F-04-00 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
ECU: ECU3 
DTC: BlB66-lC-00 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
6 
'ýN* 
lIx 
ECU: ECU1 Test 1 result 
DTC: BlAOl-13-00 <N> 
Vsnapshot: 13.25 
Tsnapshot: 03: 53: 40 
ECU: ECU2 
DTC: U201F-04-00 <N> 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
DTC: BlOA2-00-00 <D> 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
ECU: ECU3 
DTC: BlB66-1C-00 <N> 
Vsnapshot: N/A 
Tsnapshot: N/A 
Fig. 6-6. pre- and post-test DTCs. 
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The test can reveal two potential outputs. Firstly and ideally, a pinpoint 
identification of faulty behaviour by an ECU due to a low voltage event; or 
secondly to identify the legitimacy of the DTC setting methodology i. e. whether 
DTC setting strategies work correctly under low voltage fault conditions. The 
requirement may switch between the two outputs depending on whether the testing 
is mainly design validation (DTC strategy validation) or production validation 
(accurate fault identification within a whole system environment). 
A simple rule-based technique may be implemented for this task, as shown 
below. 
IF INJECTED_FA ULT IS CRANKING_WA VEFORM 
AND DTC-DESCRIPTIONIS BATTERY VOLTA GE_RELEVANT 
THEN DTC IS LEGITIAMTE 
In Fig. 6-6, for instance, after 'Test I' has finished, DTC BIB66-IC was 
logged in the ECU3, and DTC BIAOI-13 was logged in the ECUL Both are 
detected as new DTCs. According to a manufacturer- specific DTC database, the 
DTC BIB66-IC means 'Temperature Sensor I-Circuit Voltage Out of Range' 
which can be relevant to the low voltage faults. Hence, the DTC BIB66-IC is 
classified as a legitimate DTC. In contrast, the DTC BIAOI-13 can be interpreted 
as 'Output I -Circuit Open', which seems incorrect 
because the actual 'Outputl' 
circuit is not broken. Therefore this DTC is classified as an illegitimate DTC. This 
indicates that the ECUl's DTC setting strategy may not be sufficiently robust 
against the fault recently injected. In the extreme, this type of 
inaccurate diagnosis 
may lead to incorrect repair action in service impacting warranty costs and 
levels of 
customer satisfaction. 
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6.5 Redundant channels 
In the experiment on fault isolation using multiple discrete events, if the main 
communication channel is unavailable, it is impossible for all local diagnostic data 
in all ECUs to be analysed in the diagnostic ECU. Therefore, a redundant channel 
through which the local diagnostic data is transmitted is required. Fortunately, 
FlexRay, which is expected to become an in-vehicle network for safety-critical 
applications, currently provides a dual-channel network topology which will allow 
the diagnostic ECU to communicate with other ECUs over the available working 
channel. 
Apart from the wired redundant channel, on-board diagnostic information could 
be transferred over a wireless link such as Bluetooth for which other in-vehicle 
applications have already been introduced [123,124]. A potential application of 
Bluetooth for a wireless redundant network is illustrated in Fig. 6-7 where each 
ECU has an additional secure wireless link with the other ECUs. The wireless 
access point in the in-vehicle wireless personal area network (WPAN) presented in 
[124] would become unnecessary since Bluetooth-enabled consumer electronic 
devices would wirelessly communicate with the ECUs directly, provided that very 
high data security is implemented. 
An ideal network topology is shown in Fig. 6-8. The wired network is still in use 
for safety-critical applications. The topology will allow quick access to an individual 
Wired in-vehicle network e. a. CAN 
Fig. 6-7. Suggested secure wireless redundant network. 
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Secure wireless redundant network for ECUs 
------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bluetooth-enabled consumer electronic device 
.............. Wireless link 
................... 
-- -------------------- ............................. I ..................... Wireless Personal Area Network 
(WPAN) 
------------------------------- - --------------------------------------- ............... 
II iF 1 
- -------------------------------------------- 
- ------- ------------- ------ * ----------- * ------------- 
Secure wireless redundant network for ECUs 
I ECU --------- ECU -------- ECU -------- ECU --------- ECU 
ýP_ I 
Wired in-vehicle network e. g. CAN 
Fig. 6-8. Ideal in-vehicle wireless networks. 
ECU and low level data e. g. diagnostic or ECU calibration data. However, this 
ideal topology will require a very extreme data security policy that prevents access 
from unauthorised devices. For example, an ECU in the network could be assigned 
to be a master ECU to act as an access point, shown in Fig. 6-9. The master ECU is 
responsible for authorising access to the redundant wireless network. It is noted 
that data communication over the wireless network should strictly be for read-only, 
non-security and non-safety-related data. ECU configuration and calibration should 
not be accessed without authorisation. 
Bluetooth-enabled consumer electronic device 
Wireless link 
Master ECU controlling secure and authorised access 
---------------------------- ----------------- 
---------------------------- ....... 
-------------- Wireless Personal 
Area Network 
(WPAN) 
------------------------------ -------------------------------- T -------------- 
Wred in-vehicle network e. g. CAN 
E ECU ........ -------- -------- 
Secure wireless redundant network for ECUs --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fig. 6-9. Wireless networks with a master ECU functioning as an access point. 
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6.6 The proposed framework for a self-healing vehicle 
The Self-Healing Vehicle concept introduced in [16] outlines a required paradigm 
shift of fault diagnostics and fault management of in-vehicle electronic systems, 
and explores the key research questions that need to be answered in order for a self- 
healing vehicle to be realised. 
The Self-Healing Vehicle concept, illustrated in Fig. 6-10, is intended to 
mitigate failures within the vehicle's embedded software and electronic control 
systems in order to 'safely keep the vehicle on the road'. The concept envisages a 
vehicle equipped with a standardised, general purpose, networked computing 
architecture that facilitates software and application mobility. This mechanism will 
be managed by an intelligent fault management system with access to remote 
support services via a telematics link. The intelligent black box (iB 
2) 
Will 
efficiently use available information in a vehicle that is currently under-utilised. 
This information is the large volume of real-time component-, feature- or network- 
related information flowing through the vehicle's networks. Intelligent use of this 
information will be a key factor in the accurate operation of whole-vehicle 
diagnostics and prognostics, and the overall effectiveness of the fault management 
system [ 16]. 
Diagnostic & 
Vehicle Data 
)p Intelli ent Prognostic 
Diagnostic & 
g ti 
Black Box 
Information Prognos c 
(iB 2) 
Information, 
14 Data logging Interrogation 
commands 
Distributed -vehicle Whole 
Remote 
-vehicle in 
Fault Diagnostics 
:C I ics lematics Telematics 
electronic 
and Prognostics 
S Support rt Support 
system 
Verification of 
intervention 
outcomes SW Downloads, 
Intelligent Fault Enhancement to 
Management Confirmed Failure diagnostic system, 
4 Diagnoses Remote commands. 
Corrective 
, 
intervention 
Whole-vehicle Fault Management System 
Fig. 6-10. The Self-Healing Vehicle concept (adapted from [ 16]). 
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The envisaged iB 2 is a system capable of performing the following important 
functions: 
Monitoring of a variety of data sources such as network conditions, system 
and component resources, internal ECU data, etc.; 
Intelligent data mining, data compression, filtering and analysis; 
* Adapting its behaviour under the instruction from the whole-vehicle 
diagnostic and prognostic system; 
Proactive system observations for fault diagnosis and prognosis. 
These functions will support the on-board whole-vehicle fault management in 
obtaining accurate diagnoses. Clearly, the framework and methods proposed in this 
thesis will fulfil some of these required functions, in particular the on-board 
monitoring and utilising the system infonnation--component-, feature-, and 
network-related information. 
As illustrated in Fig. 6-11, network information can be analysed by an 
intelligent network diagnostic and prognostic process. As a result, accurate 
diagnoses can be generated, and an alarm is triggered when predicted healthiness of 
the network falls below a threshold value (T). 
In-vehicle Network Information 
- Busload 
- Error frames 
-'missing messages' 
-'timeout' 
-'too many messages' 
- etc. 
Network health 
alarm 
Available network-relevant DTCs 
-------- -- 
: 41 
10 T---- 
Network past predicted t 
Diagnostics to 
and 
Prognostics Possible causes M= Faulty 
EC 
ED 
10 
E E 
5 
ECU D 
Fig. 6-11. The proposed framework for network diagnostics and prognostics. 
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The proposed framework and methods can be applied to network prognostics or 
monitoring of deteriorated components. Fault location using multiple discrete 
events, network health presented in the full system experiment and statistical data 
extracted from network fault codes representing different fault types can indicate 
which components are faulty or deteriorating. 
A statistical data presentation is illustrated in Fig. 6-12 where frequencies of 
occurrence of different faults are displayed. For instance, the component that is 
pointed by the fault code 0004 will need to be examined by the fault management 
system such that corrective actions can be made i. e. signals or messages that 
normally flow through this component might need to be relayed to an alternative 
component. 
60 
50 - 
40 - 
on 41) 
E 30 - 
20 - 
10 - 
0 
Ia Frequency of occurrence (per day) 
0001 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 0007 0008 0009 0010 
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Fig. 6-12. Statistical data presentation. 
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In summary, this chapter has discussed the experimental results, the limitations 
of the work, resource requirements, the redundant channel configurations for 
transferring diagnostic information, and the obvious impact of the work on vehicle 
manufacturing and development. In particular, the impact on an automated testing 
process carried out during vehicle manufacturing has been discussed. Finally, the 
major contribution of the proposed network level diagnostics framework to the 
realisation of a self-healing vehicle has been presented. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and future work 
The rapidly increasing number of networked electronic systems and software 
features in automotive applications has inevitably led to higher system complexity. 
This in turn raises the likelihood for unpredicted or emergent behaviour that could 
not have been anticipated during ever shrinking system design, development, and 
validation and test cycles. Furthermore, rising feature levels have resulted in the 
embedded software and electronic components becoming an increasing proportion 
of the total value of the vehicle, and consequently an increasing proportion of the 
overall warranty costs. 
Against this background, vehicle manufacturers are striving to reduce costs and 
to improve levels of customer satisfaction in terms of vehicle reliability by 
deploying various test and validation approaches in the manufacturing process. 
However, it is still impossible to perform exhaustive testing and validation because 
of the large number of possible system states, which may result in vehicles not 
working properly due to some untested design flaws and implementation errors. 
This is compounded by wear out and manufacturing tolerances of mechanical, 
electrical and electronic components. To date, current on-board vehicle diagnostics 
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have been playing an important role in monitoring and recording vehicle faults for 
later off-board analysis. Diagnostic tools are used to read recorded DTCs as 
guidance in locating faulty devices off-board at service centres. 
Despite the availability of the current on-board and off-board diagnostic tools, 
fault information provided is mostly local, i. e. DTCs are localised for a particular 
subsystem in a particular ECU. Lack of real-time fault information of the 
interaction among ECUs in the network-wide perspective may result in inaccurate 
and time-consuming fault diagnostics and rectification. As system complexity 
continues to increase,, off-board approaches have become more costly and 
sometimes ineffective,, resulting in high levels of "no-fault-found", incorrect 
component replacement, increased warranty costs and discouraged brand loyalty. 
This thesis has first briefly discussed how customer expectations and 
satisfaction in terms of vehicle reliability could be met, and warranty costs could be 
reduced in spite of the increasing complexity. A potential solution is a new 
approach to vehicle fault management which requires a paradigm shift from off- 
board dealership-based diagnostics and repair, to fully on-board autonomous or 
remote ly-assi sted diagnostics and in-vehicle repair. This new concept, namely the 
Self-Healing Vehicle, has been introduced by the researchers in the intelligent 
vehicle research area. 
The main contribution of the thesis to the automotive industry is that the 
proposed novel framework and methods for on-board diagnostics at the network 
level will potentially fulfil one of the requirements for the realisation of the Self- 
Healing Vehicle concept (see publications [17,109,114]). Designed to conform to 
the well-established FDI-FD scheme, the framework creates an important link 
between the three different diagnostic levels in the whole vehicle, thereby 
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improving the ability in diagnosing failures that have impact all over the three 
diagnostic levels. The impact in all levels, traditionally analysed off-board at 
service centres, is managed and analysed together on-board. As a result, 
appropriate interventions can be taken in order to keep the vehicle in a safely 
driveable condition. 
The framework, which consists of a network interface module, a diagnostic 
module, a knowledge base and a fault database, suggests a means of all local 
diagnostic information in all diagnostic levels being gathered and analysed by an 
on-board whole-vehicle fault management system. The proposed Adaptive OSEK 
NM can provide improved accuracy, robustness and continuity of network level 
fault detection (see publication [115]). Knowledge-based diagnosis is proposed to 
be deployed in the framework where existing diagnostic information sources can be 
gathered for building a dependable knowledge base-FMEA documents, CAN bus 
specification and test data. The diagnosed results in the fault database provide 
network-wide information in addition to the traditional local DTCs logged in 
ECUs. 
For practical applications, experimental trials with RINDS have been carried 
out by using a network simulation tool, a HIL simulator, a disturbance simulator, 
simulated ECUs and real ECUs networked on an industrial in-vehicle electrical and 
electronic test rig, namely Lab-Car. The preliminary software-based simulation was 
the first trial for proof of the framework's concept, where message rate fault 
detection and Adaptive OSEK NM, a new approach to network level fault 
detection, were simulated. The partial system experiment was next conducted to 
test the CBR diagnostic algorithm when functioning in real-time with a real ECU 
connected on a real bus. RINDS was 
finally tested with the test rig in the full 
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system experiment where all inputs were fed into the network interface module. 
The full system experiment demonstrated how RINDS performs when connected 
with an in-vehicle electrical and electronic system which is almost identical to that 
in a real vehicle. 
As demonstrated through the trials, RINDS has been implemented for 
diagnosing network level faults on-board as well as providing more real-time 
diagnostic data, and more detailed and self-explanatory outcomes. This system can 
provide increased diagnostic capability when compared with traditional diagnostic 
methods in terms of robustness, coverage and continuity of detecting message 
communication faults. The underlying incipient network problems traditionally 
ignored are now picked up for thorough fault diagnostics. Network prognostics 
required in an intelligent vehicle can be further achieved. The experimental results 
of the trials will be submitted for publication [125,126]. 
Future work will focus on the main following areas. 
oA field trial with RINDS in a real vehicle; 
0 Extended work on whether the "too-many-mes sage" detection developed in 
this work could be further adopted for detecting babbling idiot failures 
[127]; 
*A detailed investigation into fault location by inferring message error 
signals; 
0 In-vehicle network prognostics. 
These are vital to an enhancement of network level diagnostics and prognostics 
which will be key elements of working towards on-board whole-vehicle 
fault 
diagnostics, fault prognostics and fault management. 
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Despite available approaches to fault management from a number of non- 
automotive domains,, the approaches cannot be simply applied to the automotive 
domain due to obvious constraints such as costs and different end users. The 
aerospace industry has employed fault management approaches for decades, 
involving bespoke components and redundant systems, in particular for safety- 
critical applications. Inevitably, such approaches are extremely costly and therefore 
not well suited for applications in the automotive industry. 
It has been common in the telecommunication industry to employ a cluster of 
generic processing components to operate multi-layered fault management 
techniques that deliver the desired levels of system availability and fault tolerance. 
The application and adaptation of such an approach could be the most cost- 
effective solution for the automotive industry. Instead of using bespoke and 
application-specific ECUs, the use of generic processing components will allow 
software applications in a faulty component to be re-hosted and transferred to an 
alternative or back-up component. The addition of more devices to the vehicle will 
increase availability and decrease susceptibility to faults [16]. 
The direction of future research will focus on cost-effective and intelligent 
approaches to whole-vehicle fault management, and new component and system 
architectures. For instance, the use of generic processing components to implement 
different fault management strategies in a vehicle that will achieve the required 
levels of resilience or fault tolerance, yet in a way that is cost-effective and 
realisable for the automotive domain. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Data format used in the trials of RINDS 
This appendix provides details of the data format used in the trials of RINDS. As 
summarised in Fig. A-1, the input information includes designed network 
behaviour, known fault symptoms and successful diagnoses related to the known 
fault symptoms. The output information is the diagnoses RINDS provides. The 
records in an XML format are illustrated in Fig. A-2 to Fig. A- 4. 
Designed message behaviour 
Known fault symptoms 
A 
y 
Successful diagnoses 
Diagnoses 
Fig. A-1. Input and output information of RINDS. 
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<? xml version="1,0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" standalone="yes" ?> 
- <msgDetalls> 
<! -- Forn, =ar- --> 
- <msg> 
<ID>CAN message identification in HEX-/ID> 
<rate-, Specified message transmission rate in msg/s</rate> 
<bus>Bus name up to 6 characters</bus 
- <transmitter> 
<name >Trans mitt er name up to 6 characters</name> 
<NMnodeID>NM node identification in case of direct NM</NMnodeID> 
</transmitter> 
<NM>OSEK Network Management type d: direct; i: indirect</NM> 
<diagReqMsgID >Diagnostic request message ID</diagReqMsgID> 
<diagResMsgID>Diagnostic response message ID</diagResMsgID> 
</msg> 
<! -- 
- <msg> 
<ID>DxO7F</ID> 
<rate> 125</rate> 
<bus>Body</bus> 
<NM>d</NM> 
- <transmitter> 
<name>Door-L</name> 
<NMnodeID>25</NMnodeID> 
</transmitter> 
<diagReqMsgID>Ox6DD</diagReqMsgID> 
<diagResMsgID>Dx6G 1</diagResMsgID> 
</msg> 
</msgDetails> 
Fig. A-2. Designed message behaviour. 
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Appendix B: Calculation of the similarity between cases 
The similarity can be calculated by using: 
Sim 
= 
identical 
(identical + different) 
where, for two compared cases, "identical" is how many features that have the 
same values, and "different" is how many features that have different values. 
For instance, a simple case structure can be written as: 
case N= [fl, f2, f3, f4 ] 
= [NM, timeout, missingMsg, tooManyMsg] 
where N is a case ID; 
f, is a case feature; 
timeout is "timeout" flag (0 or 1); 
missingMsg is "missing-message', flag (0 or 1); 
tooManyMsg is "too-many-message" flag (0 or 1). 
A similarity value for the following cases is 0.5: 
case I= [i, 0,1,0] case 2= [i, 0,0,1] 
A similarity value for the following cases is 0.75: 
case 3= [i, 0,1,0] case 4= [d, 0,1,0] 
In the trial of RINDS, the case structure can be further written as: 
case N= [info],, [fl, 
f2, f3, f4 ] ; current case 
= [info],, [NM, timeout, missingMsg, tooManyMsg] 
case N= [info], [fl, 
f2, f3, f4] [knowledge], ; stored case 
== [infoln[NM, timeout, missingMsg, tooManyMsg][knowledgeln 
where N is a case ID; 
f, is a case feature; 
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[info],, includes additional information of a particular case N such as an 
ECU name; 
[knowledge], consists of diagnostic knowledge of case N. 
After retrieving similar cases, the diagnostic module adapts the retrieved cases 
to solve the current problem i. e. by adapting diagnostic knowledge associated with 
the adapted cases, possible fault causes can be provided. 
Consider a current case and case 4 mentioned previously: 
current case = [info], [i, 0,1,0] 
case 4= [infO14[d, 0,1,0][knowledge]4 
with a designed threshold of the similarity value e. g. 0.75, case 4 is selected to be 
adapted to solve the current case even though the NM features are different. It 
should be noted that "[info], " is ignored when calculating a similarity value in 
order to retrieve cases which have similar fault symptoms on different messages. 
The diagnosed result stored in a case is: 
diagnosed case = [info]ji, 0,1,0] [result] [knowledge14 
where "[result]" field contains additional result information e. g. which cases have 
been adapted, the similarity value, etc. 
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Appendix C: Calculated bus resistance 
Bus resistance can be calculated as follows. 
Bus resistance = 
Rdiff 
(iotal) x Rd 
Rdýfliotal) + Rd 
where Rdff(,,,,,, ) is the total differential bus resistance without the wire resistance 
calculated by using the equation 2-1 and Rd is the injected resistance of the 
disturbance simulator. The Rdff in the equation 2-1 is assumed to be 20 kf2 (the 
minimum Rdiff of the PCA82C25 1, a widely-used CAN bus driver from PhilipSTM). 
The calculated bus resistance in the full system experiment is illustrated in the two 
figures below. 
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Appendix D: Summarised results of the partial system experiment 
-------------------- 
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